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Abstract 
As technology continues to advance the domain of cyber defense, signature and 
heuristic detection mechanisms continue to require human operators to make judgements 
about the correctness of machine decisions. Human cyber defense operators rely on their 
experience, expertise, and understanding of network security, when conducting cyber-
based investigations, in order to detect and respond to cyber alerts. Ever growing 
quantities of cyber alerts and network traffic, coupled with systemic manpower issues, 
mean no one has the time to review or change decisions made by operators. Since these 
cyber alert decisions ultimately do not get reviewed again, an inaccurate decision could 
cause grave damage to the network and host systems. The Cyber Intruder Alert Testbed 
(CIAT), a synthetic task environment (STE), was expanded to include investigative 
pattern of behavior monitoring and confidence reporting capabilities [1]. By analyzing 
the behavior and confidence of participants while they conducted cyber-based 
investigations, this research was able to identify a mapping between investigative patterns 
of behavior and decision confidence. The total time spent on a decision, the time spent 
using different investigative tools, and total number of tool transitions, were all factors 
which influenced the reported confidence of participants when conducting cyber-based 
investigations.  
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ESTIMATING DEFENSIVE CYBER OPERATOR DECISION CONFIDENCE 
 
I. Introduction 
1.1 General Issue/Motivation 
Cyber operators, the colloquial term for humans engaged in cyber defense 
activities on the Air Force Enterprise Network, are tasked with making judgements and 
decisions about the correctness of machine decisions, including how to remedy network or 
host-based threats. For the purposes of this research, only network-based threats are of 
importance, as they must be delivered over a monitored and defended network to a target 
machine. The Cyber Intruder Alert Testbed (CIAT) synthetic task environment (STE) 
mimics a real-world security information and event management (SIEM) system, allowing 
for cyber-based alerts to be displayed and analyzed by the user [1]. Human operators 
interact with the system by identifying, validating, and tracking network-based security 
threats to the network. Thus, operations and training require humans to excel in the 
understanding of their task, such that they can make informed and correct decisions even 
if the tools and sensors may not always be correct. Typically it takes 6-12 months to 
become comfortable and confident on these weapons systems based on personal subjective 
levels of analysis. Once a human is certified on a system, they must maintain currency and 
proficiency on a month-to-month basis with yearly evaluations to ensure they are properly 
prepared to handle their job requirements. A "one size fits all" method of training is not 
necessarily tailored to individual operator’s areas needing improvement, so those lacking 
in experience or confidence in select areas may or may not receive the most effective 
training regimen. It is impractical, if not impossible, to prepare these cyber operators for 
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every task or scenario they may encounter, thus they will have to rely on their own 
independent reasoning and problem solving skills based on their training and experience. 
The investigative process for each alert is dependent on the information available and the 
operator’s expertise and experience. These investigations ultimately lead to the operator 
making a decision with some level of confidence. The level of decision confidence may be 
measured using behavioral indicators, subjective indicators, and even electrophysiological 
indicators. Decision confidence, defined by Insabato et al., is the feeling of having done 
something correctly or incorrectly, which is an important aspect of subject experience 
during decision-making as this increases for correct decisions and decreases for error 
decisions [2]. With the ability to identify cyber operators in low confidence situations, 
they can be augmented with increased attentiveness by other cyber operators, which in 
effect would be a tailored and specific usage of quality control to improve operations. 
Additionally, these low confidence situations, if detectable, would allow for tailored 
training to remedy these otherwise lower confidence situations. In worst case scenarios, 
trends may be established to identify when a cyber operator is in their normal state of 
decision confidence, be it normally high or low, and flag or alert the operator to decisions 
made outside their normal threshold.  
1.2 Problem Statement 
By observing the behavior and estimating the decision confidence of human 
subjects while they make decisions in a cyber-defense task environment, we may be able 
to identify when an operator needs assistance. Assistance may then be provided in the 
form of investigation review, training, and operational work using the new decision 
3 
confidence information. Using machine learning-based behavior pattern classifications, 
we may be able to map changes in confidence levels to address variations in tool 
compatibility, analyst skillsets or experience, and workload. 
Previous human research in decision confidence has primarily focused on interview and 
survey type experiments where participants were asked to self-assess their decision 
confidence. The objective is to expand on past human research into decision confidence, 
specifically in the domain of cyber-defense, by observing the operator’s investigative 
patterns of behavior. Decision confidence will be estimated using decision performance 
measures such as time to decision, accuracy/correctness, and the participant’s self-reported 
confidence. Physiological data will be recorded from electroencephalogram (EEG), 
electrocardiogram (ECG), and electrooculography (EOG) equipment, for association with 
mental and physical behaviors related to decision confidence. The behavior observed 
while participants investigate cyber-alerts in the CIAT STE will carry over to real-world 
cyber-based alert investigations, as the environment and tools resemble what cyber-
defense analysts would use. Understanding the investigative patterns of behavior and 
estimating decision confidence will lead to a better understanding of how decisions are 
made. 
1.3 Research Questions/Hypotheses 
RQ1: What does the pattern of behavior, exhibited while investigating an event, tell us 
about operator confidence in the formulation of a decision? 
Hypothesis: Investigative behavior has an effect on operator confidence. 
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RQ2: What investigative and evidence collection techniques does the operator use to make 
a decision? 
Hypothesis: Differences in decision confidence will be evident in both patterns of 
investigative behavior and differences in the operator’s electrophysiology. 
RQ3: What are the behavior patterns associated with a confident decision? 
Hypothesis: Operator behavior patterns associated with higher confidence will be 
reflected in faster decision-making and quantifiable electrophysiological metrics. 
RQ4: What are the behavior patterns associated with a correct and confident decision? 
Hypothesis: Operator behavior patterns associated with high confidence and 
correct decision selection, will exhibit electrophysiological metrics which are 
quantifiably different from decisions made in lower confidence. 
1.4 Research Focus 
The focus of this research is to estimate decision confidence during a cyber defense 
investigation. While investigating the effect of alert difficulty on the investigative patterns 
of behavior, decision confidence will be determined by mapping the patterns of behavior 
to self-reported factors and recorded physiological information. If the investigative 
workflow and behavior patterns can be mapped to known electrophysiological indicators 
of the formulation of a decision and the associated decision confidence, then the more 
readily available non-physiological measurements can be used to estimate human decision 
confidence in order to provide feedback for efficiency and performance enhancement. 
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1.5 Methodology 
The methodology is composed of three distinct parts, because each portion allows 
for observations which can then be identified and correlated across the other parts in order 
to model the formulation of a decision. Collecting self-reported confidence scores for each 
investigation is the easiest to obtain and review, thus it will be the first focus.  
The self-reported confidence scoring was done by presenting the participant’s with 
Likert scales. Likert-type scales are frequently used in medical education research and  
clinical studies to measure self-reported data such as anxiety or self-confidence [3], [4]. 
The typical Likert scale is a 5- or 7- point ordinal scale used by respondents to rate the 
degree to which they agree or disagree with a statement [3], [5]. The reason a Likert-type 
scale was selected was to benefit from the ordinal scale. A 3-point ordinal scale of “not 
confident”, “somewhat confident”, and “very confident” was created. An ordinal scale 
allowed for distinct answer choices, but made comparing raw values difficult since the 
scale is not necessarily equidistant. The Likert-type scale used in this experiment was set 
to a scale of 0-100 values, using 3 subjective anchor words. The CIAT STE would display 
the Likert scale to the participant during each cyber-alert investigation. After a certain 
amount of alerts, the participant would be asked to rank the alerts, in order from top-to-
bottom, as highest-to-lowest confidence, respectively. This ordering task forces any ties to 
be broken, should any of the alerts have identical Likert scale values. The numeric 
confidence scores are not available to the participant while they complete this ordering 
task. Since the participants will not have access to their confidence scores, they will have 
to rely on their notes and short-term memory. The ordering task acts as a validation 
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control, ensuring the participants understood the confidence scores and the relation of 
alerts when comparing them to each other. 
The second method is a behavioral analysis, made possible by observing and 
analyzing the workflow of each investigative and decision-making choice. Behavioral 
analysis involves recording the timing and value of every mouse click and keyboard input. 
By cataloging and reconstructing this data, a workflow and timeline can be generated for 
each participant. This workflow will replay the investigation of every alert, including 
every tool accessed and how long each tool was accessed. In addition, the recorded 
workflow can identify when tools were skipped or avoided. Skipping or avoiding tools 
could suggest learning effects or mistakes, dependent on other behavioral features. The 
intent of the behavioral analysis is to determine whether certain actions cause changes to 
confidence when reviewing the accuracy of alerts. 
The final method to investigate is the relationships of the previous two methods 
with the participant’s physiological measurements. Various sensors will record the 
electrophysiological activity of each participant as they complete the cyber-alert 
investigations. Similar to patterns of behavior, the physiology of each participant will 
allow for an analysis of the evidence accumulation process when conducting the cyber-
alert investigations. Additionally, certain physiological patterns manifest during decision-
making, dependent on confidence [2]. 
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1.6 Assumptions and Limitations 
1.6.1 Assumptions 
All of these methods are susceptible to the learning effect. The learning effect 
explains accelerated improvement to new or unfamiliar tasks, which would otherwise be 
negligible if someone was experienced with a task. All participants, especially those 
without any formal cyber security experience, will be learning and improving their cyber 
alert investigation process during the experiment. Because human subjects continuously 
absorb information about their surroundings, they cannot be expected to treat each alert as 
independent. Tool and process familiarity must be accounted for outside of the 
experiment, in order to minimize the effects of workflow improvement during the 
experiment. Therefore, a 2-hour training phase was created to reduce the learning effect 
for participants. The training phase involved interface and tool familiarization, as well as a 
hands-on tutorial with a step-by-step investigation walkthrough using several example 
alerts. The training phase also included a complete round of alerts, where participants 
were allowed to practice without assistance. The assumption is that the participant will 
know enough about how to conduct a cyber-based investigation and make a decision 
based on the evidence they collect. The 2-hour training phase occurred prior to the 
experiment. Participant selection assumed that participants would understand how to 
operate a computer, and be willing to undergo training in order to understand and practice 
the cyber-alert investigative process. 
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1.6.2 Limitations 
Participants were recruited from students, faculty, and staff of the Air Force 
Institute of Technology. Because the backgrounds of participants in this experiment may 
be different from the background of a typical cyber operator, it may be necessary to 
conduct additional experiments to validate whether the findings are similar for participants 
with a background in cyber security who are more familiar with cyber security tools and 
concepts.  
The CIAT STE uses one computer screen, meaning that all of the options and 
actions available to the participant were presented all at once. The STE differs from real-
world scenarios and situations, in that all of the tools are available in one display window 
and in one location. Real-world systems typically require multiple tools, systems, and 
computer monitors in order to access relevant information while conducting a cyber-based 
investigation. In order to eliminate additional timing factors, such as window switching 
between tools, the design choice of one main window with all tools and alert information 
was made. Because the tools and interface were only on one screen, as the experiment’s 
results are limited to environments with similar limitations. The modular nature of this 
STE allows for relatively easy changes to be made to mimic other capabilities or tools, if 
that becomes the focus of future research. 
1.7 Contributions 
This study refines other work on cyber decision-making and decision confidence, 
with the inclusion of physiological measurements. In addition, the cyber-defense focus on 
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the patterns of behavior provides empirical evidence of otherwise subjective 
measurements for decision-making and decision confidence. 
Although more analysis is necessary, especially in the realm of EEG, the patterns 
of behavior deduced from the trove of user-provided mouse clicks and keyboard input 
suggests that certain activity is repeated throughout the investigative process, up to and 
including when a decision is made. The usage of tools, and the order at which they were 
used, provides key insight into the workflow and process each participant uses when 
gathering information to make an informed decision. The participant’s tendency to 
alternate between tools, time on a tool, and creation of notes indicates a degree of 
confidence which may be isolated and compared between participants and across one 
participant’s completion of 30 alerts. Furthermore, consistency in the participant’s 
subjective decision confidence and the experiment’s estimated alert difficulty, as well as 
the average time to complete each investigation and selection of a decision, enables 
various data features to be analyzed and compared across participants, ensuring the 
consistency and validity of the intended alert difficulty. 
1.8 Preview 
The rest of the document will be divided into four chapters. In Chapter II, the 
Literature Review will define several definitions and concepts which led to the 
formulation of this research. The Literature Review identifies gaps in understanding the 
investigative decision-making process and decision confidence in cyber defense. Chapter 
III greatly expands upon the methodology and intricacies specific to the setup and creation 
of the experiment. Chapter IV will describe the compilation and analysis of the data 
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recorded from the experiment, and present the results. Finally, Chapter V will conclude 
with a discussion of the results and recommendations for future work. 
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II. Literature Review 
2.1 Chapter Overview 
The purpose of this chapter is to provide a synopsis of the known research in the 
area of cyber defense decision-making. Computer science concepts, relationships, and 
psychology ideas relevant to the pursuit of this research, will be defined. The major 
themes of decision-making research are confidence, certitude, and self-confidence. With 
an understanding of the previously completed work in the realm of cyber defense, the 
reasons behind the pursuit of researching cyber defense decision confidence should 
become clear. 
2.2 Definitions, Themes, and Concepts 
The Merriam-Webster Dictionary defines confidence as a feeling or consciousness 
of one’s powers or of reliance on one’s circumstances [6]. In the field of cyber defense, 
analysts and operators rely on their computer systems and skill, in order to make 
decisions. These decisions may be confined by information availability and the time 
remaining to make a decision. The feeling of confidence is subjective. Feelings cannot 
accurately be captured within the bounds of numerical measurements, and feelings can 
change spontaneously.  
Decision confidence describes how confident a person feels when considering how 
they feel about their decision. Confidence is difficult to measure if the information 
available to make the decision, or if the scale used to represent the measuring of 
confidence, is misunderstood. Therefore a measuring scale for decision-making tasks, 
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which can record confidence, is required. This scale is known as a decision self-efficacy 
scale [7]. 
Self-efficacy is confidence in one’s ability to achieve an intended result [8]. The 
process leading to the result must be scrutinized for validity, as various effects of bias can 
corrupt the decision-making process. Bias describes a person’s tendency to view 
something from a particular perspective. Biases may prevent or impede a person from 
being objective and impartial [9].  
Several key biases, which this research needs to be aware of during the 
experimentation process, will be highlighted in this chapter. Biases, with respect to a 
participant’s decision-making could lead to greatly skewed results. For example, the way 
in which information is presented to participants could prime or bias them towards this 
information should they come across it again later during the experiment. Methods for 
controlling these biases will be expounded upon in the Chapter III, Methodology.  
Pfleeger separates biases as status quo, framing effects, optimism, control, 
confirmation, and the endowment effect [9]. Status quo is simply the resistance of an 
individual to change their behavior without a reason or incentive. Feedback and 
repercussions for actions can be used to address and reduce status quo biases. Framing 
effects bias involves the presentation or manner in which information is presented. The 
efficacy of a trial can be framed in terms of gains, rather than losses, or by appealing to 
particular characteristics. This method of information presentation, e.g. ordering or words 
used, can influence and dramatically affect the decision. Similar to framing effects, 
priming or anchoring also leads to biases, as information presented earlier is easier to rely 
on than information presented later.  
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Optimism bias is the belief that a person will perform or be presented with a higher 
likelihood of positive events. This bias is an over or under estimation of the likelihood of 
positive and negative events occurring. Optimism bias may, for example, induce people to 
ignore preventive care measures, such as patching software, because they believe they are 
unlikely to be affected [9]. Similar to the optimism bias, control bias is the tendency of 
people to believe they can control or influence outcomes they clearly cannot.  
Confirmation bias is the tendency of favoring or interpreting information based on 
previously held “confirmed” beliefs. When looking at a situation, a person affected by 
confirmation bias will tend to place a higher emphasis on confirming and aligning with 
their previously held beliefs than reviewing the situation across all facets. This short-
circuit of the decision-making process can become evident due in part to the speed at 
which a decision is made, or by creating situations or presenting evidence in a way to 
catch those who do not review all pertinent areas of the information. The endowment 
effect bias describes the fact that people usually place a higher value on objects they own 
than objects they do not own [9]. This may lead people to react more strongly to a loss 
than to a gain. For example, when an action is expressed as a loss of privacy, rather than a 
gain in capability, people tend to act negatively.  
For the pilot community, Holland and Freeman explored mishaps involving the 
loss of situation awareness of F-16 pilots, and deemed the occurrences due to channelized 
attention [10]. Channelized attention is similar to a confirmation bias, in that the human 
subject’s focus may make them miss or completely dismiss other relevant information due 
to their preconceived notion or fixation on other elements of information. Cyber defense 
and piloting aircraft can involve much of the same sorts of tasks, such as accurately 
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gauging and maintaining situation awareness of the environment. Graphic user interface 
(GUI) construction, specifically those involving various colors that users must react to, 
can lead to channelized attention. Users may focus the majority of their time and effort on 
visual information which is color coded by priority, for example, and disregard relevant 
but different colored information.  
Slight nuances, such as the ordering of cyber alerts, can illicit different behaviors 
and responses. Network events are typically ordered from newest-to-oldest, due to how 
host, network, and intrusion detection systems detect and report traffic. Investigating 
traffic out of order can hide malicious payloads or cause traffic to look benign. This can be 
dangerous in the cyber defense environment, because the standardization of protocols and 
traffic may make many things look almost identical. An awareness of participant’s 
reliance on past performance or behavior indicators for decision-making, especially when 
they are new to a task, is of valid concern when reviewing participant behavior. 
Outside of biases, there are other concepts that influence decision confidence, such 
as choice certainty, cues to action, and situation awareness. Decisions are usually 
accompanied by a degree of certainty or confidence, which reflects a graded belief about 
the likelihood of different outcomes [11]. Choice certainty facilitates adaptive regulation 
of behavior by furnishing a basis for learning from outcome, and supports decision-
making in complex environments where subsequent decisions depend on the predicted 
outcome of recent decisions before the actual consequences are known [12]. Cues to 
action are events that trigger or remind an individual to take an action they either forgot or 
were not originally intending to take, such as a reminder about the return date for a DVD 
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to a service like Redbox, or an overdue library book. By using cues to action, one can 
influence a user to make a decision or ignore the new information [13].  
Situation awareness is a broad theme that can be applied in the cyber defense 
domain [14]. Without situation awareness, it can be difficult to decide on a course of 
action. If network defense actions are required, a lack of situation awareness could 
drastically limit or impede the necessary network actions from taking place to contain a 
threat and maintain services. Situation awareness in cyber defense ordinarily requires not 
just an understanding of the local machines and environment, but the context of machines 
geographically separated and isolated from the defender. This makes it difficult to assess 
the problem, and this detachment from the real-world environment affects the perceived 
risk-versus-reward for the operator, as they at least rarely have physical repercussions to 
worry about due to a decision.  
Tyworth and his colleagues assert that the greater research community tends to 
focus analytical attention on new technologies instead of understanding and improving the 
underlying socio-cognitive work performed by human cyber security professionals [14]. 
Their solution argues for distributing situation awareness across human and technological 
agents, thereby re-focusing and enhancing the human-centric approach needed in cyber 
defense analysis. Typically, the human resource is the hardest to recruit, train, and 
maintain, thus technological solutions seem more valuable in the short-term to cover these 
gaps by producing rapid and consistent data analysis. Yet, a human is involved in all 
cases, either as the creator of the hardware and software solution or in-the-loop deciding 
whether to follow the guidance of the technology. Humans and technology end up not 
working in tandem, as the technology is still reliant on the human to program or tell it how 
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to carry out the analysis task. Technology enables the human to create or become aware of 
a situation, through the use of visual or other sensory cues. Endsley’s experiments on 
measuring cognitive perspective of human operator’s understanding of an environment at 
a particular point in time, artificially controlled through the use of freeze-probe 
measurements techniques, brought about a well-valued theory of situation awareness in 
dynamic systems [15]. Tyworth suggests that the situation awareness technique proposed 
by Endsley, is unable to distinguish between situation awareness based on knowledge and 
experience of the operator or from the underlying technologies which support the insight 
alone.  
Cyber defense analysts struggle with low situation awareness due in part to the 
speed and rigor they are required to categorize incoming and outgoing traffic. These 
analysts may not know why something is or is not worth paying special attention to, 
because of their limited situation awareness. This situation awareness gap is due in part to 
policy, but mostly due to the vastness of the threat landscape which analysts are expected 
to patrol. Cyber defense organizations are typically structured into separate teams or tiers, 
with increasing levels providing further insight into the network through tools and 
capabilities. The cyber defense analyst in this research is typically located at the lowest 
level in a cyber organization, where they monitor and react to near real-time network 
alerts. This lowest level is the first, and sometimes only, chance to identify and react to 
potentially malicious network activity. The goal of this new research is to identify when 
and how decision confidence plays a role in the formation of decisions by human analysts, 
such that the correct areas can be focused on for improvement. 
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The last concept, taken from behavioral science literature, is that recognition is 
significantly easier than recall [9]. Cyber defenders are tasked with rapidly cataloging, 
identifying, and responding to potentially malicious traffic. This visually dominated work 
involves reading and surveying complex text, pictures, and numbers. Recognition tasks 
should increase confidence, as there is little investigating needing to be done outside of 
recalling a situation. Therefore, information representation must be uniform throughout 
the interface in order to produce consistent situation awareness. 
2.3 Decision-Making and Behavior 
Several papers proposed strategies and models for investigating human decision-
making. Whereas one strategy involved comparing and contrasting two popular theories of 
decision-making strategies, notably Long Term Working Memory (LTWM) and Take-
The-First (TTF), a significant exception was a paper which recommended the need to 
account for and test whether evidence was reliable, as conjecture shows this can affect 
decision-making and confidence [16], [17]. Yeung and Summerfield explore the “post-
decisional locus model” and the findings on how decisions occur and what makes people 
“change their mind” once a decision is cast. The drift-diffusion model illustrates decisions 
as an accumulation of evidence over a period of time, until either one of two thresholds, θ 
or – θ, is met or exceeded. By including the metacognitive process known as error 
monitoring, humans are able to adapt both their short- and long-term actions based on 
outcomes observed prior to their next decision. Mapping this to the drift-diffusion model, 
future outcomes based on accumulation of evidence to the decision point of one decision 
may lead a human to either maintain the decision into future situations, based no 
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additional information, or instead opt to choose the other decision based on the 
accumulation of time and evidence. Thus, observation and modeling of the underlying 
biological components of the brain is necessary, due to the subjective and malleable 
decision-making process of humans. Error monitoring seems similar, if not identical, to 
the process of learning, which is of critical importance in human subject experiments, as it 
is one of the many biases from which the experimental design intends to negate or 
minimize the effects. Additionally, when coupled with trust, error monitoring relies on 
accurate information gathering, which certain tools and systems in the experiment could 
be modulated to either accurately or inaccurately provide feedback on what course of 
action to take. Furthermore, a lack of feedback may also have the potential to affect the 
way in which error monitoring is carried out by the human. 
The two decision-making strategies proposed by Belling et al., LTWM and TTF, 
are likewise of importance due to one of the biggest assumptions of this research, namely 
the recruitment of human subjects who are not necessarily cyber defense experts [16]. The 
LTWM theory suggests that experts rely on stored knowledge when placed in a new 
environment, and the TTF heuristic relies on taking the first action that comes to mind. 
Their experiment involved several trials with human-subjects, to determine whether time 
and the number of options generated by participants affected participant accuracy in 
prediction and response trials. The procedure involved recreational-level soccer players 
viewing video clips of live soccer matches. The players were tasked to determine the next 
course of action of the recorded player, when the clip ended or occluded at a critical 
decision point. In the trials involving prediction, participants illustrated options for any 
combination of players, actions, movements, and ball position, under the focus of being a 
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defender. In the response trials, the participant rated how likely they were to pursue each 
generated course of action. Additionally, only half of the trials involved time constraints. 
The results challenged the hypothesis on whether time constraints lead to increased use of 
TTF strategies. Contrary to their expectations, LTWM strategies were employed when 
participants were under time constraints.  
Ward and colleagues reviewed decision-making strategies in various other 
disciplines, conducting experiments in competitive chess gameplay [18]. The competitive 
chess gameplay results pointed to no evidence of performance differences, under time-
constraints. In contrast, less skilled chess players showed a significant performance 
decrement. Extending this research to the cyber domain, future research could compare 
whether skilled cyber defense analysts maintain effectiveness given varying degrees of 
time-constraints.  
Because real-world cyber defense analysts must make rapid and accurate decisions 
in order to not become inundated by the volume of alerts, imposing time constraints on 
decision-making could identify when decisions become hampered by limited time. 
Likewise, the number of alerts presented to operators is tunable based on the broadening 
or constricting the signature base matching and heuristic settings of network alert sensors. 
Flooding operators with alerts and requiring a set amount of decision actions to be taken 
over a period of time could also affect the decision-making process, but this approach 
would not align with the results featured from the competitive chess players study.  
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2.4 Measuring Decision Confidence and Decision-Making 
In order to be able to estimate decision confidence, operator behavior has to be 
observed. Behavioral observation allows for passive analysis, which does not cause 
interruptions such as those experienced when compiling self-reported measurements, or 
the operator to don cumbersome equipment such as those needed for measuring 
physiological signals. This research augments behavioral analysis with self-reporting by 
participants and physiological measurements. The physiological measurements are 
included as they benefit and enhance the behavioral observations, and because it allows a 
mapping between the physical and mental parts of the body during decision-making. With 
this combined understanding of the underlying decision-making process, the behavior 
observation can then be the focus of monitoring and reacting, as this can be passively 
observed with minimal evasiveness in a cyber-based environment.  
2.4.1 Self-Assessment and Reporting 
Survey-question based human analysis dominates psychological literature and the 
vast majority of cyber effects studies involving human subjects [19]–[24]. Survey-
questions are reliant on various factors, including the subject’s experience and willingness 
to honestly self-assess. The timing of the survey questions is the single most influential 
variable in effecting the outcome. A subject’s perception is ever-changing during an 
experiment, therefore the timing of a survey question could be heavily influenced by when 
and how interruptive a question is. As discussed by He, et al., comparing and 
understanding surveys for cross-study comparisons proved very difficult due to 
inconsistent, confusing, or misunderstood measurements [25]. In this case, the research 
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attempted to not only compare and group the various definitions used by each study, but 
also the dimensions of the questioning, further supporting their argument that cross-study 
comparisons were a difficult undertaking. Survey questioning should occur in distinct 
phases during an experiment: pre-, intra-, and post-trial. Using surveys during only one or 
two of these critical phases would bear insufficient holistic information, which is critical 
in maintaining the consistency in the whole experiment allowing for normalizing of data, 
and should ease identification of outliers or inconsistent users. Additionally, any result can 
be questioned in a follow-up interview to further delineate and quantify the results [24].  
Several assumptions must be presented. A Likert scale was chosen, as it provided 
for a method to garner ordinal feedback from participants. Likert scales can be made in a 
variety of different configurations, but the most common tend to be 5- or 7- point scales. 
Questionnaires involving more than 5 options were seen as too difficult to accurately align 
with, by participants. For instance, one study involved a 100-point Likert scale with 10 
point increments, effectively making it a 10 option scale, but this was no more effective 
than asking respondents to rate on a scale of 1 to 5 for how strongly they agreed or 
disagreed with a presented choice [26], [27]. Likert scales are seen as a way of forcing a 
choice on the responder, who may not have a definitive answer, but is forced to answer 
anyway [28]. The NASA Task Load Index (NASA-TLX) questionnaire format closely 
resembles the Likert scale, although respondents are given the choice of making an in-
between measurement, such as a decimal value [29].  Additionally, emoticons were not 
advised, but an example sentence or example situation for each option of the Likert scale 
is strongly encouraged in order to help establish the scoring mindset in the responder [24]. 
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Humans are bad at self-assessment, mainly because of various biases which 
contribute to the inability to objectively evaluate skill [30], [31]. Compeau and Higgins 
postulated that extraneous factors may bias participant responses due to the nature of the 
event being measured [32], [33]. Repeated questioning of the same information may lead 
to fatigue, or disengagement, affecting the authenticity and validity of response.  
Another limitation of survey-based questionnaires are the questions themselves. 
The ordering of questions can have an effect on the outcome of later questions. Since the 
training, and experiment conditions, and questions will be identical for all of the 
participants ordering will not play a role when comparing across participants. A 
demographic and computer-usage survey will be administered in order to determine if 
frequent usage of computers in participant’s lives and job influenced their ability to 
perform the cyber defense based task. The computer-usage survey will aid in identifying 
trends, or the need for calibration when comparing reported confidence. 
Another avenue of procuring self-assessments is through interviews. Interviews 
allow for the assessor to focus on and examine qualitative features that a self-metered 
survey will not accurately record. For example, the decision time and accuracy of a 
decision can be examined, through questioning and ascertaining the exact reasoning for a 
decision or behavior, if the responder is conscious of the action in question. Unlike the 
survey methodology that will include questioning during pre-, intra-, and post-trial, the 
interviews work best before and after the trials or the entire experiment. This allows for 
minimal distraction, but requires the assessor to maintain notes or logs of the responder’s 
actions so that they can be discussed by referencing if necessary. Structured interview 
questions, concerned with analyzing the subject’s time, accuracy, and threshold for 
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decision-making, leads to a better understanding of their capabilities and expertise [9], 
[34], [35]. Unstructured, loosely controlled question and answer interviews can make it 
difficult to conduct cross-study comparisons.  
Assuming the structure of the interview can be repeatable across subjects, the 
compatibility of the results during comparisons and tabulation should be straightforward. 
Along with the survey information, the interviews will aid in stratifying and separating 
situations in which the same values or ranks were provided. Since a five point Likert scale 
is recommended for surveys, further granularity can only be achieved through 
interviewing the responder about their answers and comparing trials. Typically, interviews 
are seen as more favorable by participants, since they allow for more flexibility, compared 
to the strict numerical representation of their answers in a survey-based questionnaire, 
including the affordance to explain why or how a certain response is given. Observations 
and logs will help allow the assessor and responder to share situation awareness of the 
experiment, allowing for easy recall and play-by-play analysis of decision points and 
junctions. 
As was previously mentioned, consistency can be difficult to guarantee if the 
structure and rigor of the interviews is not maintained. Additionally, only one interview 
during each phase should be the limit, as continuous subject interviewing, similar to repeat 
survey questioning, will lead to frustration and fatigue in the participant. Lastly, another 
limitation is the timing of the interview. An interview following a trial or experiment 
should be conducted as soon as possible, as to take advantage of the short-term memory of 
the participant and to question decisions and actions while they are still fresh on the minds 
of the participants.  
24 
Since most of the benefits attributed to interviews can be contained in a survey 
questionnaire constructed to allow the participant to rank order their selections during the 
task and compare their decision based on groupings, an actual interview will be relegated 
to future experiments whereby it is more feasible or practical to illicit feedback in this 
manner. 
2.4.2 Behavioral Analysis 
Workflow and process observation are the crux of this experimental analysis. 
Pfleeger identified the behavioral aspects of security, as the concept of leveraging what is 
known about people and their perceptions in order to provide more effective security [9].  
Behavioral science literature generally supports and demonstrates that recognition is 
significantly easier than recall, possibly explaining why LTWM seemed to eclipse TTF in 
experimentation [16]. Biases also play a significant influence in human behavior, 
illustrated by the numerous constraints and assumptions imposed on this experiment in the 
methodology section. The psychology behind these biases help explain why technological 
enhancements may not always provide the expected result or effect. 
By using both subjective and objective metrics, the state of the human can be 
estimated. Human cognition is measured through physiological measurements, but 
associating the subjective measurements taken from investigating alerts may allow for an 
understanding of how decision confidence and decision-making affect each another. 
Knowing what is taking place cognitively, by way of physiological measurements, and 
associating this with the subjective correlation of the alerts, should allow for an 
understanding of how decision confidence influences and determines the decision-making 
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process. With a greater understanding of the underlying mechanics of decision confidence, 
the ability to provide near-real-time help for operators in low-confidence decision 
situations is possible. Likewise, prioritizing the review of decisions made under low 
confidence situations would allow for quality assurance mechanisms to aid in the 
verification and checking of decisions made under subpar standards. Lastly, by feeding 
this information back into training and the user interface design, the focus can be placed 
on the areas and types of decisions most often associated with low confidence. 
2.4.3 Physiological Measurements  
Electrophysiological measurements are recorded by the observer and are non-self-
reported, objective measurements of brain, heart, and muscle activity as well as other body 
states. Coupled with self-report based results taken from surveys, electrophysiological 
measurements such as EEG and ECG provide a general observation of the physical and 
mental actions taken by a participant [36], [37]. 
2.4.3.1 Electroencephalography 
Lateral Intraparietal Cortex (LIP) neuron measurements have been shown to 
represent the accumulation of evidence by subjects, leading to the formation of decisions 
and degrees of certainty [36]. With an EEG measuring apparatus, brain activity can be 
monitored during the evidence accumulation phase, through the decision-making phase, 
and into post decision-making phases. This capability will augment our understanding of 
the stresses experienced by participants. In addition, using the participant’s response 
times, coupled with network traffic and cognitive workload, it becomes possible to 
understand how decisions are formulated from the decision-making process.  
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2.4.3.2 Electrocardiography 
ECG will aid in identifying stress points or workload strains of the operator. 
Biometric monitoring involving EEG and ECG enables human performance-based 
attributes involving physical and mental manifestations of mobility and thought to be 
coupled with mental self-assessments inherent in self-reported measurements in order to 
support otherwise purely subjective-based measurements. Whereas surveys are a 
subjective assessment by the human subject, the objectivity of the biometric 
measurements is directly characterized by the subconscious mechanics of the human body. 
Biometric measurement analysis may be coupled with the subjective measurements to 
determine and characterize what is occurring in the mind and body of the human 
participant.  
2.4.3.3 Electrooculography 
Lastly, measuring eye movement and fixation is another non-self-reported element 
that monitors the subject’s visual field and to what degree they are attention-switching. 
Visual recognition utilizes the same aforementioned LIP neurons in measuring the 
formation of decision confidence and degrees of certainty [36]. Cyber defense analysts 
and operators conduct a visually focused examination of Intrusion Detection System (IDS) 
alerts, which involves recognition and memory recall. Attentiveness and situation 
awareness require focused and directed responses to visual stimuli. Visual stimuli in 
computer programs are typically presented to the user through graphical user interfaces. 
These interfaces may lessen or enhance the burden of a user attempting to gain situation 
awareness. Overloading operator cognitive resources causes performance decrement [38]. 
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This previous work investigated modifying trust in a cyber security tool, by increasing and 
decreasing the accuracy and reliability of the tool. Tool accuracy was measured by how 
much information was displayed about an alert. When the tool was more accurate the 
screen was filled with more information, showing the user what was being detected and 
acted upon, but this limited and inversely affected the performance of the human user in 
charge of agreeing or disagreeing with the computers analysis. Applying this work to 
confidence measurements, the focus on information that is pertinent and relevant to 
making a decision may not always lead to the most appropriate or correct decision. Thus, 
it is important to follow the process of information acquisition through the primary means 
of information presentation in cyber defense, which is visually through an aggregator or 
correlation platform that is fed alerts from IDS devices. Focus on a part of the screen and a 
tool, is supporting evidence of fixation and may hint at a cue to action, prior to the 
activation of the subject’s fine motor skills that are the result of some decision. 
Eye-tracking may enable the measurement of tool usage, prioritization of 
information, and other cognitive attributes related to identifying cyber investigative 
workflow [27]. Coupled with mouse movements, graphical user interface window focus, 
and keyboard input, eye-tracking provides insight into workflow, but not decision 
confidence. This methodology shows what information was reviewed and for how long, 
based on fixation, but with the assumption that the interface is simple enough in order to 
differentiate between different graphic elements and windows. 
One of the biggest limitations to eye-tracking data collection is that it is only valid 
inside the context of the training environment, i.e. what can be measured from the user 
looking at the computer screen and not outside the bounds of the computer screen [39]. 
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Additionally, as mentioned earlier, eye movements map to the participant’s accumulation 
of evidence and leads to a decision. Thus, this is only another data point to use when 
analyzing the behavior of the participant when conducting an investigation, which needs 
to fit into the broader analysis for a holistic view of how and when an operator makes a 
decision. 
2.5 Conclusions 
In summary, one of the biggest challenges evident from the literature review is the 
need to augment the subjective, user-provided information from the survey comparisons 
with the objective, physiological data. Bridging these two paradigms will provide a greater 
understanding of the actions humans take when given information and constraints in 
which to make a decision, as well as objective performance data. The biggest merit to 
survey questionnaires is the relative ease in performing measurements, but their 
consistency and validity can vary as the human participants become fatigued - because of 
the duration of the task or because of frequent surveying - which can have a negative 
effect on task attention. EEG, ECG, and other electrophysiological measurements are 
novel approaches, extended from the medical and psychology domain, to review and 
analyze reasoning and decision-making. Although they may prove to be impractical 
outside of baseline tool configuration and workflow analysis, the operator’s decision 
confidence expresses whether information presentation, user skillset, and physiological 
effects have any measurable effect on job performance.  
 Past research has shown that humans are better at resolving ambiguity and 
providing contextual mission relevant information to automated security systems, rather 
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than handling large amounts of information and weeding out false alerts, which is not the 
way humans are often employed in operational units [40]. Trusting the system through 
accuracy, timeliness, and consistency, allows for human operators to focus their efforts on 
review and analysis of ambiguous decisions. This may lead to benefits such an improved 
culling of the seemingly endless alerts present in current cyber defense aggregation and 
correlation platforms, and an improved prioritization of alerts and situations outside the 
norm that cause operators to lack confidence in their assessments.  
 Finally, as was pointed out by the various biases, the design of the experiment and 
the analysis of the participant data will need to be account for the effects of these biases, 
as they would affect the findings. The biases which can be controlled will be identified in 
the methodology chapter.   
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III. Methodology 
3.1 Chapter Overview 
The purpose of this chapter is to establishing the research questions and outline how 
the experiment will be carried out. The various factors and variables which will be 
changed, as well as recorded for analysis will be defined. The makeup of the participants, 
the required assumptions, and the analysis plan will also be covered in this chapter. 
Additionally, the CIAT STE will be showcased, with examples and pictures of how the 
tool was configured for the participants. 
3.2 Background 
Cyber defensive operations continue to be human-intensive activity.  While many 
researchers try to improve detection mechanisms, ultimately human operators will make 
judgements about the correctness of the machine decisions and how to resolve the alerts.  
Thus, research in the human component of decision-making during cyber analysis remains 
vital.  This experiment supports research which seeks to identify and characterize the 
influences of decision confidence on information gathering and investigative processing as 
it relates to the job of an Air Force Cyber Defense (ACD) Operator. 
The study investigates decision-confidence relationships between self-reported 
confidence, behavior, and psychophysiological signals collected when a participant makes 
a decision – specifically in the domain of cybersecurity defense.  By modeling the 
relationships between self-reported confidence, physiological measurements, and observed 
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data from operators conducting decisions on cyber network traffic samples, this study 
investigates the relationships between behavior patterns and decision confidence. 
The study determines the key attributes and behaviors, exhibited by cyber defense 
operators, which affect the accuracy and decision confidence of cyber triage. Correlating 
the self-reported confidence, physiological measurements, and observed behaviors 
patterns from human subjects engaged in cyber triage of traffic samples should allow for 
an understanding which can be represented by model and pattern analysis. 
EEG, ECG, and EOG signals will be collected and used to determine what 
techniques and behavior an operator uses to make a decision. Combined with decision 
accuracy and self-reported confidence results taken from the alert presentation and 
analysis software, electrophysiological measurements will provide another lens into of the 
physical and mental actions taken by a participant in order to analyze the associated 
behavior [1][2]. 
3.2.1 Research Questions 
Using the cause and effect relationships for modeling decision confidence from 
observing behavior patterns, recording self-assessed confidence, and measuring 
physiological measurements, the goal is to identify factors which correlate with 
confidence. 
Investigative Question 1: What does the pattern of behavior, exhibited while 
investigating an event, tell us about operator confidence in the formulation of a 
decision? 
Hypothesis: Investigative behavior has an effect on operator confidence. 
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How a participant investigates an alert, identified through their pattern of 
investigative behavior, indicates how confident they are in their decision. Behavioral cues, 
such as repeat visits to certain tools or shorter time spent researching, may indicate a level 
of confidence related to investigations handled in a similar manner. For this experiment 
the operator will be asked to report their confidence after making each decision selection. 
By identifying the patterns of behavior for each investigation, an estimation of operator 
decision confidence can be inferred. 
Investigative Question 2: What investigative and evidence collection techniques 
does an operator use to make a decision? 
Hypothesis: Differences in decision confidence will be evident in both patterns of 
investigative behavior and differences in the operator’s electrophysiology. 
Survey-question based human analysis dominates psychological literature and the 
vast majority of cyber effects studies involving human subjects. In order to understand 
how an investigation occurs, it is prudent to observe the behavioral and psychological 
process, in order to identify patterns. An investigation workflow handout, see Appendix F, 
will be given to each participant during both the training and experiment. Even with an 
investigation workflow handout and the associated training day, participants may “cut 
corners” or rely on tools more than others, which may affect the reported confidence. 
These investigative behavior patterns will be used to determine when a cyber alert causes 
the participant to change their behavior to overcome the difficulties of investigating a 
more difficult alert. 
Investigative Question 3: What are the behavior patterns associated with a 
confident decision? 
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Hypothesis: Operator behavior patterns associated with higher confidence will be 
reflected in faster decision-making and quantifiable electrophysiological metrics. 
The degree of confidence in a decision provides a probabilistic assessment of the 
expected outcome. Higher confidence would assert that there is a higher probability of the 
decision being correct. It is generally thought that certainty is informed by a neural 
representation of evidence at the time of a decision [36]. Results have shown that decision 
certainty was inversely correlated with reaction times and directly correlated with motion 
strength, suggesting that speedy decisions are coincident with lower confidence [11]. The 
time to a decision and the associated behaviors which led to the formulation of the 
decision, are expected to have a ceiling or maximum set of actions which, being 
quantifiable, would allow for comparing between decisions made with a higher reported 
confidence.  
Investigative Question 4: What are the behavior patterns associated with a correct 
and confident decision? 
Hypothesis: Operator behavior patterns associated with high confidence and 
correct decision selection, will exhibit electrophysiological metrics which are 
quantifiably different from decisions made in lower confidence. 
Experience, a trust of the tools, an understanding of presented information, and 
habitual work all play a role in improving the confidence of operators [41]. 
3.3 Experiment 
Human subject performance studies on decision-making often rely on self-reported 
mechanisms, such as surveys and interviews – and rarely involve interpreting confidence 
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from physiological measurements and behavior during the decision-making process [13], 
[21], [42]. This study intends to augment self-reported subjective results, by incorporating 
both behavioral and physiological measurements. The combination of self-reported results 
and physiological measurements will inform an understanding of decision-making 
behavior patterns. Through understanding how self-reported results and physiology 
correlate with behavior patterns, real-world operations could possibly be augmented by 
only observing human behavior. Behavior can be directly observed and correlated to 
decision confidence. Observing and analyzing human behavior is the only viable 
measuring technique during actual real-world cyber defense operations, as self-reported 
and physiological measuring would be impractical and cumbersome in environments 
where cyber defenders operate.  
Physiological measures included EEG, ECG, and EOG signals. These 
measurements were recorded throughout the experiment with the intent to be mapped to 
the behavior and self-reported results, in order to better understand what lead to decision 
confidence in cyber defense operators. 
3.3.1 Variables 
3.3.1.1 Independent Variables 
The independent variables, which will be manipulated during the experiment, are 
listed in Table 1. The variability of the difficulty for the alerts will allow for identification 
and correlation of purposeful low-confidence situations and situations where a higher-
confidence should be achieved. 
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Table 1:  Independent Variable Summary 
 
Alert Difficulty was estimated based on the estimated information needed to make 
the correct decision, availability of information, and the consistency of available 
information. In order to create a consistent difficulty scale for the alerts, the three 
difficulty variables were setup to identify perceived difficulty from changing the proposed 
settings of low or high. Four levels of difficulty were created, in order to aid analysis.  
The four types of difficulty include: 
A. EASY 
B. MEDIUM 
C. HARD 
D. VERY HARD 
 
Eight possible alert situations were created using each combination of the three 
factors. Figure 1 illustrates the difficulties based on each possible setting of independent 
variables. The numerical values under each difficulty were determined by the subject 
matter expert (SME). Higher numerical values indicated increasing difficulty. The four 
difficulty levels were mapped to the six numerical scores.  
Control variable   Measurement precision   Proposed settings Predicted effects  
Information Availability 
(categorical)
Amount of information in tools [Low, High]
Less availability =                          
lower confidence
Information Needed 
(categorical)
Amount of tools needed to review [Low, High]
Less needed =                              
higher confidence
Information Inconsistency 
(categorical)
Amount of conflicting information 
among tools
[Low, High]
Less inconsistency =                   
higher confidence
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Figure 1: Alert Difficulty Breakdown 
Using these six numerical scores, mapped to four difficulty levels, the independent 
variables could be modified in different ways in order to facilitate creating robust alerts. 
The proportion of the difficulties and number of alerts with false alarm or threat actions 
were not provided to the participants during the experiment, in order to avoid any counting 
or other related biases. Using the alert difficulty breakdown as a guideline for alert 
creation, a total of 10 Easy, 8 Medium, 6 Hard, and 6 Very Hard alerts were populated 
into the experiment database, and these correlated to 17 False Alarm and 13 Threat based 
actions.  
It is hypothesized that a variance in these difficulties will roughly correlate to 
participant decision confidence – the more difficult an investigation, the less confidence 
the participant should experience in their decision-making.   
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Using the difficulty proportions, the 30 total alerts were randomly distributed into 
each of the 5 rounds, see Table 2. 
Table 2: 30 Alerts with Associated Difficulties 
AlertID  Difficulty  AlertID  Difficulty 
1  Easy  16  Easy 
2  Easy  17  Very Hard 
3  Hard  18  Medium 
4  Very Hard  19  Very Hard 
5  Hard  20  Medium 
6  Easy  21  Medium 
7  Easy  22  Very Hard 
8  Hard  23  Easy 
9  Easy  24  Hard 
10  Easy  25  Medium 
11  Medium  26  Medium 
12  Very Hard  27  Medium 
13  Medium  28  Very Hard 
14  Easy  29  Hard 
15  Easy  30  Hard 
3.3.1.2 Response Variables 
Decision confidence is the primary response variable in the experiment. The self-
reported comparisons, which measure decision confidence, are assumed to be dependent 
of the other choice the participants make, which is making a decision involving the 
selection of either “False Alarm” or “Threat” for an alert. Coordinating the psychometric 
data and the investigative process behavior will allow for each aspect of the experiment to 
be replayed and analyzed, as it will be logged and recorded. 
Psychophysiological signals will be captured and analyzed in future studies, as the 
expertise of the experimenter does not support this analysis. The collection of 
psychophysiological signals is presumed to correlate to accurate subjective decision-
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making and decision confidence scoring. Alpha waves are associated with increases in 
memory load [43], [44]. Gamma waves are associated with memory load, stimulus 
novelty, attention, and reaction [45]–[48]. Theta waves are associated with decision 
certainty and error prediction [49], [50]. The response variables, which will be recorded 
and measured during the experiment, are listed in Table 3. 
Table 3:  Response Variable Summary 
 
3.3.1.3 Constant Factors 
Table 4 shows the factors which will be constant for each run of the experiment. A 
total of 30 alerts were chosen to fit the 2 hour time window of the experiment, as this is 
the upper-bound generally assumed for electrophysiological experiments. A limit of 6 
alerts per round was imposed limit in order to rely on the short-term memory of 
participants for the greatest subjective scoring efficiency. The number of alerts used for 
each difficulty will be as close to an even amount as possible, given 30 total alerts. The 
Response variable
Normal operating level         
and range
Measurement precision    
and accuracy
Relationship of response 
variable to objective
Decision choice 
(categorical)
[“False Alarm”, “Threat”] Subjective Correctness
Decision confidence 
(categorical)
[“1”, “2”, “roughly the same”] Subjective  Relative confidence
0‐131 Hz at  Alpha – (9‐12 Hz)
500 samples/sec Gamma – (30‐60 Hz)
0‐262 Hz at  Theta – (4‐8 Hz)
1,000 samples/sec
ECG (numerical) 60‐100 beats per minute Low noise Stress/workload
Depends on age/sex
Mean = 17 blinks per minute
Reading = 4.5 blinks per minute
Time per tool (categorical)
Time to decision (categorical)
Behavior Subjective 
The investigative process 
identifies exploration 
and/or techniques
Ordering of tool use 
(categorical)
EEG (numerical) 0.7 µV RMS from 1‐50 Hz
EOG (numerical) 0.7 µV RMS from 1‐50 Hz
Movement, vestibule‐
ocular reflex, blink rate, 
and saccade
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distribution of the alerts will be randomly distributed across the 5 rounds, and this 
distribution will then be used for all participants during the experiment. The information 
from each alert, including the ordering, will be identical for all participants.  
Table 4:  Constant Factors Summary 
 
 
The 30 Alerts, made up of five rounds of six alerts, were chosen to maximize the 
ability of the participants to quickly and reliably recall alerts, such that temporal ordering 
could be extrapolated from comparing small groups of alerts to each other. 
The Number of Alerts, including the four types of alert difficulty, were created by 
a subject matter expert. The four levels are: Easy, Medium, Hard, And Very Hard. The 
four levels of alert difficulty allowed for flexibility in alert creation and tool information. 
Since the amount of alerts for each difficulty were withheld from the participant, they had 
no way of relying on counting alerts per round or overall when carrying out their 
investigation. Time to gain and analyze the information from the tools was hypothesized 
to be the single most important factor in determining an alerts difficulty.  The amount of 
information available from each tool was modulated as part of the independent variables. 
Alert Ordering is determined in pre-trial experimentation; the ordering was set to 
the same for all participants.  The ordering of the alerts is anticipated to cause no effects.  
Factor Desired experimental level How controlled? Anticipated effects?
30 alerts
Participant reliance on short‐term 
memory
5 rounds of 6 alerts
Minimizes 
confusion/reliance on 
memory when 
comparing
Number of alerts (by difficulty) Normal workflow CIAT configuration None
Alert ordering Normal workflow CIAT configuration None
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3.3.1.4 Data Collection and Analysis 
Data collection was performed using CIAT, the associated CIAT logging database, 
and the Cognionics system’s physiological output file.  Each measurement was stored 
during and after each participant’s trial, but calculations on the data was only done post-
experiment.  The analysis involved looking for overall trends in the participant population, 
before analyzing the results from each participant individually. 
3.3.1.5 Test Matrix 
Table 5 shows the notional test matrix for the experiment. This matrix was 
performed on each of the 11 participants. It should be stated that the threat and false alarm 
distribution are not reflective of real-world alert distributions. The intent was to not cause 
the participant to select a blanket decision choice, knowing that the real-world threat 
amount is typically very low. Likewise, the alert difficulty distribution was intended to 
present a range of possible difficulties so that the participant was forced into states of low 
and high confidence, which can be used in mapping the behavioral data to the 
electrophysiological data in future work. 
Table 5:  Test Matrix 
Round Alert Difficulty Truth Choice/Confidence Expected Time | Confidence 
1 EASY THREAT Short | High 
1 EASY THREAT Medium | High 
1 HARD FALSE ALARM Long | Medium 
1 VERY HARD FALSE ALARM Long | Low 
1 HARD THREAT Short | Low 
1 EASY THREAT Medium | High 
2 EASY FALSE ALARM Medium | Medium 
2 HARD FALSE ALARM Medium | High 
2 EASY THREAT Medium | High 
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2 EASY FALSE ALARM Medium | Low 
2 MEDIUM FALSE ALARM Long | Medium 
2 VERY HARD FALSE ALARM Long | Low 
3 MEDIUM THREAT Medium | High 
3 EASY THREAT Short | High 
3 EASY FALSE ALARM Short | High 
3 EASY THREAT Short | High 
3 VERY HARD FALSE ALARM Long | Low 
3 MEDIUM FALSE ALARM Short | Medium 
4 VERY HARD FALSE ALARM Medium | Medium 
4 MEDIUM FALSE ALARM Short | Low 
4 MEDIUM THREAT Short | High 
4 VERY HARD FALSE ALARM Medium | Low 
4 EASY THREAT Medium | High 
4 HARD FALSE ALARM Medium | Low 
5 MEDIUM THREAT Long | High 
5 MEDIUM THREAT Medium | Medium 
5 MEDIUM FALSE ALARM Long | Medium 
5 VERY HARD FALSE ALARM Short | Low 
5 HARD FALSE ALARM Short | Medium 
5 HARD THREAT Medium | Low 
 
3.3.2 Participants 
For this study 11 participants, all male, were recruited, see Appendix A and 
Appendix B. All participants in this study were voluntary military and government civilian 
personnel. Participants were not compensated for their participation. The participant’s 
ages were between 22 to 34 years, with a mean age of 26, and a median age of 25 (one 
subject did not report demographic information). All participants had at a minimum a 
Bachelor’s Degree, and used electronic devices in their job and on a daily basis in their 
lives. Exclusion criteria included inability to use a mouse and keyboard, visual impairment 
or inability to view information on a computer screen, and specific motor, perceptual, or 
cognitive conditions which precluded them from operating a computer. Additionally, 
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because participant electrophysiological data was to be collected, they consented to the 
placement of electrodes on their head, face, and chest. Additionally, each participant’s 
cyber security experience and whether they had earned any cybersecurity certifications, 
were recorded. Participant’s consent was obtained prior to starting their participation in 
the study.  
3.3.3 Materials 
The synthetic task environment used in this study was a modified version of the 
Cyber Intruder Alert Testbed, also known as CIAT [23]. CIAT provided the underlying 
features and capabilities, which enabled this research to benefit from a stable interface and 
tested database system. CIAT, and the associated databases, were modified to reflect the 
addition of EEG equipment, and to allow for tailored cyber alerts more relevant to the 
experiments for this research. 
For the experiment day, participants were asked to complete a pre-/post- 
experiment questionnaire. The pre-experiment questionnaire, see Appendix C, asked the 
participant to account for their most recent amount of sleep and caffeine intake for future 
correlation purposes. The post-experiment questionnaire, see Appendix D, asked the 
participant to rate the difficulty of the cyber investigations on a Likert Scale, from 1 to 5. 
Additionally, demographic information was requested, involving the participant’s 
electronic device usage, electronic device usage in their job, whether they had 
cybersecurity experience, their age, gender, and highest education level. 
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3.3.3.1 CIAT 2.0 
For the purposes of this research a modified version of CIAT, named CIAT 2.0, 
was created. The changes are in three parts, one part focusing on the design of the 
interface, the next part on the database and the alerts created, and the last part on the 
program and databases interface with the EEG timing and sensor equipment. Henceforth 
CIAT 2.0 will just be referred to as CIAT. 
The task for the study was a computer-based investigation activity. During each 
investigation, participants interact with the CIAT program through a computer interface 
using mouse and keyboard. The CIAT interface provides a method for recording the 
investigation steps the participant takes, and enables the participant to self-report decision 
confidence on each investigation.  EEG, ECG, and EOG signals was triggered by CIAT 
and collected by the Cognionics Data Acquisition suite of tools, see 3.3.3.2 for more 
information on how the EEG data is collected [1], [51]. 
3.3.3.1.1 Interface 
The interface in CIAT was split three main windows: Baselining Questions, Alert 
Screen, and Confidence Ranking. The Baselining Questions window was the first activity 
presented to the user when they opened the CIAT program. 
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Figure 2 : Baselining Questions Sample 
Figure 2 shows an example baseline question, as it would appear for the user. The 
user would then have to use their mouse to click on their answer choice. Throughout the 
experiment, after a selection is made another window would appear, requesting the user 
measure their associated confidence for their answer choice. 
45 
 
Figure 3 : Determine Confidence Sample 
 The user would use the slider, as shown in Figure 3, to rate their decision 
confidence on a scale of 0-100. Additionally, three subjective anchor words were used in 
order to provide further separation when reporting decision confidence. Both the verbiage 
and raw value, seen above the submit button, is visible for the user to rate their decision. 
The Baselining Questions consisted of three examples during the Practice round, and 
seven examples during the Experiment round. The Baselining Questions were the same for 
all users. In addition to the number comparison shown in Figure 2, two more Baselining 
Questions were asked.  
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Figure 4 : Number-to-Car Baselining Question Sample 
 
Figure 5 : Car-to-Car Baselining Question Sample 
The second and third styles are shown, taken from the Practice round, in Figure 4 
and Figure 5 respectively. Cars were selected in the baseline, as this required minimal 
background knowledge to answer, and was something that all participants could safely be 
assumed to see or interact with on a daily basis based on transportation norms in society. 
Other possible baselining questions, such as arithmetic problems or history-based 
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questions involving United States Presidents, were ultimately decided against because of 
the possibility of involving other brain signals or memory recall which would have greatly 
varied based on participant’s abilities outside of what was being measured. 
The Alerts Screen was the main window the user would see, and where they would spend 
the majority of their time with CIAT. Figure 6 shows a sample of alerts taken from the 
Alert Screen during the Practice round. Appendix E labels the primary features of the 
Alert Screen. 
Figure 6 : Alerts Screen Sample 
The Alerts Screen in CIAT displays the alerts at the top, in colors based on their 
relative severity level, the tool selection in the middle, and an area for note taking and the 
decision choices at the bottom. The severity levels are used to differentiate visually 
between the alerts, and do not associate with the alert difficulty. The participants were 
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briefed during the training day that the severity level did not relate to the intended 
difficulty. With this setup, the user must directly select tools for results to be displayed. 
This allows for recording of every aspect of the investigative process, while the user 
researches and decides whether the alert is a Threat or False Alarm. Figure 7 demonstrate 
what is expected of a participant while they investigate each alert. 
 
Figure 7: Generalized Workflow 
 Once the user completed a round of six alerts, the user is presented with a new 
screen. The task for the alert confidence ranking screen, see Figure 8, is to move and sort 
the alerts from most confident (on the top) to least confident (on the bottom), by reviewing 
the notes the user submitted for each alert during their investigation. The alerts displayed 
in the top box must be dragged and dropped, and rearranged, in the bottom box before 
Select an alert
Read the data 
from the alert
Investigate 
the alert by 
reviewing the 
available tools
Write up 
evidence and 
justification
Decide on 
action for 
alert activity
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submitting. This task acts as a quality control mechanism for the analysis. By having the 
user verify the order of the alerts, without having the confidence scores they submitted 
from the previous screen, they must rely on their short term memory and feelings when 
ordering these alerts.  
 
Figure 8: Alert Confidence Ranking 
 Once the user submits the alert confidence ranking, they will see the alert screen 
again, Figure 6, but with new alerts. This will repeat for 5 rounds of alerts, for a total of 30 
alerts during the experiment. For the practice, the participants were given 2 rounds of 
alerts, for a total of 12 alerts. 
3.3.3.1.2 Timing Database and Triggers 
In order to track the behavior and investigative process of the users, mouse and 
keyboard input was logged. This allowed for a play-by-play reconstruction of each user’s 
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exploration through the tool, including the notes they typed, and the choices they made. 
Coupled with each of these events were the triggers, which were time-synchronized with 
the data generated by the EEG sensors. In total, there were 19 different timing events 
generated by CIAT, which were logged in the timing database. These timing events 
included items such as when forms were displayed, when a button was pressed, and when 
decision choices were selected by the user. Coupled with this timing information were 
triggers sent to the EEG measurement equipment, which provided each timing event to be 
sliced and time synchronized, during post-processing analysis, with the database. 
3.3.3.2 EEG / ECG / EOG Equipment 
Participants interacted with the CIAT program running on a desktop machine in 
the lab, which was configured to send trigger time sync data to the researcher’s laptop 
computer in order to synchronize the recording of the collected electrophysiological data. 
To collect EEG data, participants wore a dry electrode harness as shown in Figure 9. 
Purchased from Cognionics, Inc., the Cognionics Mobile Series Headset was made up of a 
harness capable of recording up to 72 channels. A total of 66 electrode channels were 
recorded on the EEG cap, including the ground electrode. One electrode, located near the 
neck behind the right ear, was used as a reference node. In addition, seven electrodes were 
added as three additional channels, for 69 total channels, in order to capture the EOG and 
ECG data. Six of these electrodes were set as pairs, one positive and one negative, and one 
electrode was a shared ground. Two pairs of electrodes, one pair per channel, were used 
for the EOG data, see Figure 10. One pair of electrodes was used for the ECG, which 
included the ground on its channel, see Figure 11. These electrodes measured brain 
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activity and sent signals to the laptop computer using a wireless Bluetooth connection 
where the signals were recorded. The Cognionics Mobile Series Headset recorded at a rate 
of 1000 samples per second. The Cognionics Data Acquisition suite of tools was used to 
capture and process the EEG data into the Biosemi (.BDF) file format. 
 
Figure 9: Cognionics Mobile Series Headset EEG Cap and Harness 
 The EOG electrodes were placed on four locations on the face, as shown in Figure 
10, in order to measure the blink rate and direction of eye movement. A shared ground 
electrode was used between the EOG and ECG.  
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Figure 10: EOG Electrode Placement on Face 
The ECG electrode placement, see Figure 11, shows where the two ECG 
electrodes would be placed on the participant’s chest and also where the shared ground 
would be placed. 
 
Figure 11: ECG Electrode Placement 
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Both the EOG and ECG data were collected as exterior (EXT) node measurements, 
as they were connected to the Cognionics EEG cap through a Universal Serial Bus 3.0 
(USB 3.0) Data AcQuisition Module (DAQ), which fed the information to the researcher’s 
laptop wirelessly. 
3.3.3.3 EEG – Cognionics Mobile-72 Wireless EEG System 
The Cognionics Mobile Series Headset collects all of the EEG data from the 
participant. The intent of collecting EEG measurements was to map the associated 
behaviors of the participant during the alert investigations. CIAT recorded the windows 
and tools that the participant used for each alert, as these were important for associating 
events that led to changes in EEG measurements. Due to time constraints, EEG will be left 
to future work. 
3.3.3.4 ECG – Cognionics 1-channel + shared ground electrode 
ECG measurements were associated with timestamps of the decision selections 
(e.g. False Alarm or Threat). Similar to EEG measurements, ECG were used to measure 
workload and stress as the participant conducts and validates their decisions [37]. ECG 
analysis will be left to future work. 
3.3.3.5 EOG – Cognionics 2-channel + shared ground electrode 
EOG measurement analysis recorded blinks, saccades and visual fixation, which 
are associated with levels of perception, concentration, awareness, and the learning and 
training progress of learners [2], [52]. The intent of measuring eye movement, and the 
associated dwell time, was to indicate levels of confusion or exploration by the participant. 
Additionally, rapid eye movements indicate other factors such as graphic user interface 
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frustration, which might affect decision-making and decision-confidence.  EOG 
recordings can be used to augment EEG-artifact cleaning process since eye muscle 
movements are a large source of these artifacts. EOG analysis will be left to future work. 
3.4 Assumptions 
The following assumptions are made for this experiment: 
 The confidence of a decision is dependent on the decision-making process 
up to the choice of the decision. It is assumed that in this experiment 
structure, once a decision is made it cannot be changed.  
 The participants are not withholding information, and are willing to 
honestly self-assess in their decision confidence, based on their decision-
making. 
 The participants have not been told of the experiment or prepped, by 
another participant, before participating in the experiment. 
3.5 Procedures 
The participant’s activities were split between two days of up to two hours on each 
day. The first day included a familiarization lecture and hands-on training with the CIAT 
program, as well as cyber security fundamentals. Training involved multiple participants 
with one instructor, with class sizes between 2 and 4 participants. Four separate training 
days were used to train 11 participants. The training day activities were conducted in a 
classroom environment, with computers and a projector screen to present the training 
lecture and demonstrate the CIAT program. The first task the participants practiced was 
the decision confidence baseline, which involved three types of questions requiring the 
55 
participant to pick the best answer from a set of two answer choices, see Section 3.3.3.1.1. 
The intent of the decision confidence baseline was to use familiar concepts and example 
questions to prepare the participant to understand how they must think about evaluating 
their decision confidence.  
The second task involved interface familiarization and a workflow walkthrough for 
two alerts by the instructor. Each of the participants was given a general workflow process 
as a handout, which was also available to them during the experiment, see Appendix F. 
After these two alerts were completed, the participants were allowed to open the CIAT 
program and follow along with one example while the instructor guided all participants. 
After all of the participants had completed these three alerts as a class, three new alerts 
were provided. The participants were instructed to work at their own pace, and on their 
own, but they could seek help from the instructor. Once all the participants completed 
these three alerts, the instructor reviewed these alerts and provided their notes and 
confidence ratings as a comparison.  
After the round of six alerts, a new screen was displayed in CIAT requiring the 
participant to rank each respective alert based on the relative decision confidence to each 
other alert. During each of these first six alerts, also referred to as the first round, the 
instructor provided their own decision selection, decision confidence score, and their 
associated case notes, which participants could read and ask questions about. After 
familiarizing the participants with the decision confidence ranking task, the participants 
were given the remaining time to complete six alerts at their own pace, but without any 
discussion about the decision, the decision confidence score, or the case notes from the 
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instructor. In total, the training day consisted of two rounds of six alerts, for the participant 
to practice and understand their job and the task environment. 
An individual 2-hour experiment block was scheduled for each participant.  Only 
one participant was scheduled during a 2-hour block.  Each participant had to first 
complete the training before being scheduled on a subsequent day for their experiment.  
All experiment days occurred within two weeks of the day the participant completed 
training.  
In the experiment, the participant first completed a pre-experiment questionnaire, 
see Appendix C. The pre-experiment questionnaire asked the participant to quantify and 
qualify their sleep from the night before, and their level of alertness and ability to 
complete the task.  
Next the participant was prepped and configured with the EEG, EOG, and ECG 
equipment before being asked to sit at a desk with the associated computer terminal 
loaded with the CIAT software. Once the systems were checked for accurate readings, the 
participant was allowed to begin the experiment by opening up the CIAT program. All 
three tasks were identical to what the participant had seen and practiced on the training 
day, albeit instead of 12 total alerts across 2 rounds, they were given 30 total alerts across 
5 rounds. The partitioning of the alerts into 5 rounds of 6 alerts was intended to enable 
participants to recall the previous 6 decisions they made so they could reflect on those 
alerts during the decision-confidence ranking step. One by one, the participant would 
investigate each alert and determine whether it was a false alarm or threat.  Additionally, 
the participant was required to input case notes justifying their reasoning for the decision 
before submitting a decision. This justification would also aid them in recalling the 
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information during the decision confidence comparison stage since the tools were not 
available for review when they were tasked to perform the relative confidence comparison 
between rounds. Because each alert investigation was estimated to take 2-3 minutes to 
complete, a round of 6 alerts was expected to take up to 18 minutes to complete. Since the 
equipment necessary to conduct the electrophysiological measurements, and the posture of 
the participant, needed to be controlled during these sections, a pause between these 
rounds allowed for a short break to adjust before proceeding. Between each of the rounds, 
the participant was required to complete a decision confidence ranking.  
Once the final alerts were investigated, and the final round was ordered by relative 
confidence, the participant was asked to complete a post-experiment questionnaire, see 
Appendix D. The post-experiment questionnaire asked the participant to rate how difficult 
the cyber investigations were overall. Additionally, computer usage experience and 
demographic information was surveyed in the questionnaire. 
3.6 Analysis Strategy 
All collected data was analyzed with python and statistics packages. Analysis 
focused on the results of decision choice and decision confidence. The decision 
confidence from participants was compared to the truth data, from an experienced analyst 
(the baseline), which was correlated with the control factors to determine which changes 
incurred the greatest effect on decision confidence. 
First the baselining questions were reviewed, as they were important for EEG 
analysis. The baseline questions, if calibrated correctly, would establish known distinct 
difficulty levels which could be mapped to electrophysiological data. Since the difficulties 
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are only ordinal, they would allow for a relative comparison between different states of 
physiology the participant might be in. Similarly, the patterns of behavior associated with 
baseline decision-making and alert decision-making could be reviewed for similarities, 
although the tasks are wildly different. The baseline questions do not require an 
investigation, and only rely on comparing numbers or car weights, therefore the 
electrophysiology may prove more relevant than the behavior patterns. A rank comparison 
will be done to validate that the difficulties were ordered as intended. 
The expectations for the behavior pattern analysis involved reviewing and 
analyzing the recorded data from CIAT. Time to decision, for example, could be an 
indicator of confidence. Looking back at the Test Matrix, see Table 5, the expected 
averaged results for the time to decide and the confidence level for the alerts in each round 
based on the difficulty. The expected values acted as a hypothesis for the data analysis. 
The choices made by participants, and the correctness, indicated whether alert difficulty 
correctly aligned with our intended alert difficulty. Easy alerts were expected to have 
almost 100% accuracy, whereas very hard alerts were expected to be of much lower 
accuracy. A rank comparison will be done to validate the difficulties were ordered as 
intended. Notional results were illustrated in Figure 12 and Figure 13. 
Figure 12 illustrates a notional representation of the participant times per alert 
difficulty. Data exploration, such as trend and correlation comparisons, enabled key 
decision-making behaviors to be identified. The questionnaire data, concerning the 
participant’s computer skill or general degree of confidence, was analyzed in order to 
identify whether any correlation could be found with time to decision. It is hypothesized 
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that participant’s with past experience and skills in cyber will perform better than those 
participant’s without these skills.  
 
Figure 12: (Notional) Time to Decision 
 
Figure 13 charts the relative confidence of each of the difficulty tiers of alerts.  
Grouping and clustering can be used to determine the general decision-making disposition 
of individuals, in order to see who and possibly analyze why individuals responded 
similarly. 
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Figure 13: (Notional) Difficulty vs Decision Confidence 
Other factors of analysis interest include tool usage trends, how long tools are 
used, and how frequently tools are transitioned between. Analyzing these behaviors may 
reveal exploration behavior, by the participant’s, which may associate with lower 
confidence. For example, the participant may only need to consult one or a few tools in 
order to make a decision, in cases of easier alert difficulty, whereas they may have to 
spend more time and review tools countless times as the alert difficulty is increased.  
Participant experience may play a part in understanding the behavioral differences, 
associated with how investigations may differ between alert difficulties. Therefore a 
general workflow guideline, for the participants to rely on, will be provided on both the 
training and experiment days. The training day will focus on teaching the workflow 
process in order to provide all participants a baseline level of knowledge for conducting 
cyber based alert investigations. 
Analysis of the electrophysiological data will be future work. A recommended 
approach for the EEG data is applying the diffusion model. The diffusion model is a 
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model of the cognitive processes made during one- or two-choice decisions [53]. The 
drift-diffusion model suggests participants will quickly decide upon an initial course of 
action based on the available information, and use future stimuli to either further fortify or 
contradict their decision [17], [53]. The correlation to the EEG measurements and the 
process by which the participant comes to a decision, would provide insight into how the 
participant’s behaviors influence decision-making. Likely graphs to be presented include 
comparison-based and cluster-based overlay charts, to determine similarities among 
participants when conducting investigative behavior which will be cross-correlated with 
the tool and timing information collected from CIAT. 
3.7 Summary 
In summary, the methodology explained in this chapter establishes the foundation 
for how the experiment was created and set the expectations for data collection. By 
recording the behavioral data of participants, through the CIAT STE, this research allows 
for analyzing how confidence is affected by patterns of investigative behavior. This 
analysis strategy appropriately looks to review and calibrate the baseline questions and the 
investigative cyber alerts, prior to doing any behavior comparisons among the participants. 
After the difficulty is calibrated, data exploration will elaborate hypotheses which were 
tested in order to answer the research questions for this paper. 
The next chapter describes the analysis conducted on the compiled data. It became 
evident in the early stages of the data analysis, that the initial difficulty classifications of 
some of the alerts needed to be fixed and recalibrated. Section 4.2.2 explains why this was 
needed, and how the alert difficulties were tuned after all of the participants had 
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completed the experiment. Additionally, since the electrophysiological measurements 
were reliant on finding expertise to conduct the analysis, the primary focus was on 
identifying and creating a methodology which prioritized capturing behavioral metrics 
from the CIAT tool independent of the external EEG equipment.  
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IV. Analysis and Results 
4.1 Chapter Overview 
The purpose of this chapter is to explain the data exploration and analysis process 
which led to the results. The investigative patterns of behavior for each participant were 
explored. Each participant’s results were compared to each other, and to the population of 
participants. Several identifiable behaviors were extracted from the data, and will be 
analyzed in the results section. The results will also be highlighted in the conclusions of 
Chapter V.  
4.2 Behavioral and Subjective Analysis and Results 
The initial analysis of the participant’s investigation activity involved plotting both 
the accuracy and confidence scores against difficulty to determine whether the differences 
in alert difficulty had the intended effect of causing variations in the confidence scores 
when comparing alerts across the same participant or between participants.  
4.2.1 Baseline Review 
Reviewing the 7 baseline questions was done first in order to construct and 
validate a data analysis process which would be scaled to the 30 alerts from the 
experiment. These were made up of 4 Easy, 0 Medium, 2 Hard, and 1 Very Hard 
questions. Figure 14 shows the plotted confidence values of all participants for the 
baseline questions. The participant’s reported different confidences for each of the alert 
types, but this needs to be validated by reviewing the rank correlation.  
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Figure 14: Baseline Comparison of Confidence versus Difficulty 
A ranking correlation comparison was done using the Mann-Whitney U test. 
Comparing each of the questions’ estimated difficulty with the confidence of the 
participants yielded statistically significant results, which correctly ordered the alerts by 
what was intended. The average confidence of each alert difficulty among each participant 
was input into the Mann-Whitney U test. The easy alerts were of a higher confidence 
relative to the hard alerts, which was statistically significant (U-stat(11) = 3.973, p = 
7.105x10^-5), where the alpha value (significance level) = 0.05. The positive value of the 
U-stat means that the easy alerts were ordered higher than the hard alerts. This was 
repeated for each combination of alerts, in order to determine a rank ordering of the 
baseline alert difficulties with the reported confidence. For hard and very hard alerts, the 
U-stat was significant (U-stat(11) = 2.791, p = 0.005258). Likewise, the results for the 
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easy and very hard alerts were also significant (U-stat(11) = 3.973, p = 7.105x10^-5). This 
confirms an ordering of the alert difficulties, from most to least confident, as easy > hard > 
very hard. Note that there were no medium alerts in the baseline. These results meant the 
calibration of the baseline alerts was correct.  
A scatter plot comparing the difficulty of the baseline comparisons by difficulty 
versus accuracy was created, see Figure 15. The clusters of accuracy for each of the alerts 
was separated by 1 for correct, and 0 for not correct. A similar rank comparison was done 
with the alerts based on accuracy. 
 
Figure 15: Baseline Comparison of Accuracy versus Difficulty 
Using the Mann-Whitney U test again, the accuracy of each alert was ranked and 
compared for statistical significance. Using the same alpha value of 0.05, the only 
significant ordering was easy and hard alerts (U-stat(11) = 2.397, p = 0.01654). Therefore, 
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the only ordering which could be correlated from the accuracy was that the easy alerts had 
a higher accuracy than the hard alerts. 
The intent of the baseline was to familiarize the participant with how to answer 
questions and select a confidence. All the behavior and scores during this simple task were 
recorded, so that future calibration and analysis could be done when coupled with the 
electrophysiological measurements. With a known and calibrated baseline, the 
participant’s EEG results could be compared from their performance on the alerts. 
Knowing that the difficulties were correctly ordered, by confidence, would also be useful 
for identifying and comparing behavioral trends. 
4.2.2 Alerts Review 
During the compilation of the results for the 30 alerts and the initial review of 
alerts, the SME raised concerns that alterations to the CIAT tools and database may have 
led to some alerts being incorrectly calibrated. The goal for creating 30 alerts was to make 
as close to an equal amount of alerts for each difficulty as possible. These 30 alerts were 
originally calibrated such that 10 alerts were easy, 8 medium, 6 hard, and 6 very hard. 
Table 6 shows the original breakdown of the 30 alerts by correct response and difficulty.  
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Table 6: 30 Cyber Alerts for Experiment (Original Calibration) 
AlertID  CorrectResponse  Difficulty 
1  Threat  Easy 
2  Threat  Easy 
3  FalseAlarm  Hard 
4  FalseAlarm  Very Hard 
5  Threat  Hard 
6  Threat  Easy 
7  FalseAlarm  Easy 
8  FalseAlarm  Hard 
9  Threat  Easy 
10  FalseAlarm  Easy 
11  FalseAlarm  Medium 
12  FalseAlarm  Very Hard 
13  Threat  Medium 
14  Threat  Easy 
15  FalseAlarm  Easy 
16  Threat  Easy 
17  FalseAlarm  Very Hard 
18  FalseAlarm  Medium 
19  FalseAlarm  Very Hard 
20  FalseAlarm  Medium 
21  Threat  Medium 
22  FalseAlarm  Very Hard 
23  Threat  Easy 
24  FalseAlarm  Hard 
25  Threat  Medium 
26  Threat  Medium 
27  FalseAlarm  Medium 
28  FalseAlarm  Very Hard 
29  FalseAlarm  Hard 
30  Threat  Hard 
 
During the construction of the CIAT tool and alert database, the self-imposed 
limitation of 2 hours for participant experimentation trials, led to changes being 
implemented for the tools. The information available in several tools and the alert 
metadata were changed to minimize confusion by participants without cyber experience 
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and also to target a per alert investigation time of 2-3 minutes, so that the experiment 
could be conducted within the allotted time of 2 hours. All of the alerts were created by 
one SME with several weapon system certifications and three years of experience on an 
Air Force cyber defense weapon system. Since the computer experience and cyber skillset 
of the participants varied between those with cyber security experience and certificates 
and those without, it was important to calibrate the alerts in such a way as to allow anyone 
with minimal training to be able to identify signs of good and bad cyber based network 
activity. All participants were familiar with computer usage, and use computers on a daily 
basis for their jobs and with their daily life, but investigating cyber alerts was a task the 
majority of participants had not conducted prior to this study. Thus, confidence scores 
were scrutinized based on the intended thresholds set by the difficulty. For example, very 
low confidence scores on easy alerts and high confidence scores on very hard alerts were 
suspect and reviewed first to identify whether the alerts created the intended difficulty. 
The difficulty was set based on three main characteristics: information needed, 
information available, and consistency of the information. Validating the intended 
difficulty levels, such that the subjective confidence metrics were consistent across and 
between participants was important for identifying the influence of behavior during the 
investigations. Each difficulty category: easy, medium, hard, and very hard, was charted 
relative to each participant’s accuracy, investigation time, and rated confidence score.  
The initial review of these alerts suggested that the alerts were not calibrated to the 
difficulty level intended. Thus, all alerts were reviewed again by the SME to determine if 
any of the alerts had changed in difficulty due to changes to the initial quantity and 
verbosity of the information available in the tools in CIAT. After reviewing all the 
69 
experiment alerts, it was determined that a total of 19 alerts needed alterations such as a 
correction to the difficulty score for 17 alerts and changes to the correct answer for 5 
alerts. Any outliers identified in the scatter plots of the difficulty versus accuracy and 
difficulty versus confidence were now attributed to consistency per participants. The 
updated difficulty spread for these 30 alerts was updated to 11 easy, 6 medium, 9 hard, 
and 4 very hard. Table 7 shows the updated correct responses and recalibrated difficulties 
as the cells highlighted in yellow. Due to the recalibration, the amounts for the correct 
responses were also changed from 17 False Alarms and 13 Threats, to 14 False Alarms 
and 16 Threats. 
Table 7: 30 Cyber Alerts for Experiment (Updated Calibration) 
AlertID  Correct Response  Difficulty  AlertID  Correct Response  Difficulty 
1  Threat  Easy  16  Threat  Very Hard 
2  Threat  Easy  17  False Alarm  Hard 
3  False Alarm  Hard  18  Threat  Easy 
4  False Alarm  Very Hard  19  False Alarm  Very Hard 
5  Threat  Hard  20  False Alarm  Medium 
6  Threat  Easy  21  False Alarm  Easy 
7  False Alarm  Medium  22  Threat  Medium 
8  Threat  Hard  23  Threat  Medium 
9  Threat  Hard  24  False Alarm  Hard 
10  False Alarm  Easy  25  Threat  Hard 
11  False Alarm  Medium  26  Threat  Easy 
12  Threat  Very Hard  27  False Alarm  Hard 
13  Threat  Easy  28  False Alarm  Easy 
14  Threat  Medium  29  False Alarm  Easy 
15  False Alarm  Hard  30  Threat  Easy 
 
Using the newly recalibrated alerts, plots were created similar to the baseline 
comparisons in order to continue data exploration. Figure 16 displays the confidence 
versus difficulty of the original 30 alerts prior to recalibration. The same plots were 
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generated for the 30 alerts as were generated for the baseline analysis. Figure 17 displays 
the confidence versus difficulty plot of all 30 alerts after the recalibration took place. 
Similar to the baseline comparison plots, the higher difficulties were illustrated by 
confidence scores which were more spread out. The Easy difficulty, represented as 1, 
showed the highest concentration in higher confidence scores.  
 
Figure 16: Cyber Alert Comparison of Confidence versus Difficulty (Original Calibration) 
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Figure 17: Cyber Alert Comparison of Confidence versus Difficulty (Updated Calibration) 
The next task was to validate the intended difficulties of the alerts, as these were 
the main instrument for affecting the confidence level of participants. A large spread of 
confidence score is visible, see Figure 17, for each of the difficulties. Using the Mann-
Whitney U test, the confidence of each alert was ranked and compared for statistical 
significance. Using an alpha value of 0.05, the only significant ordering was between easy 
and very hard alerts (U-stat(11,4) = 2.068, p = 0.03860). This means that only the easy and 
very hard difficulties have a statistical significance, allowing for rank ordering.  
Going through the same process as was done for the baseline, a rank comparison 
test was completed. Again, the Mann-Whitney U test was used. Using an alpha value of 
0.05, various orders were statistically significant. The easy and hard alerts (U-stat(11,9) = 
2.594, p = 0.009493), easy and very hard alerts (U-stat(11,4) = 3.283, p = 0.001026), 
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medium and very hard alerts (U-stat(6,4) = 2.791, p = 0.005258), and hard and very hard 
alerts (U-stat(9,4) = 2.856, p = 0.004284) were all statistically significant with p values 
greatly below 0.05. This means that the ordering of the alerts by accuracy, from most to 
least accurate, is easy > medium > hard > very hard. 
4.2.3 Data Exploration 
During the initial data exploration, it was hypothesized that the ordering of tool 
use, the time per tool, and the overall time to a decision would correlate to the differences 
when comparing the confidence of each alert decision, per participant. 
Data exploration into the ordering of tool usage was cursory and did not provide 
for a sufficient way to readily compare within a participant or between participants. In 
order to allow for time to explore the other hypotheses, tool order was skipped in the 
hopes of being returned to later, when other trends had been identified which caused a 
need to review the ordering of tool usage. Thus, the focus of data exploration moved to 
reviewing the time per tool and frequency of tool use for alerts. The actual metric for time 
per tool was calculated by looking at the time in each tool, given various other factors.  
4.2.3.1 Analyzing Time-in-Tool 
Figure 18 illustrates the total time spent in a tool, combined per each alert, to 
showcase which tools the participant’s spent the most time. This metric was called the 
time-in-tool. Each participant’s time-in-tool performance was compared to the reported 
confidence scores, for identifying behavior trends. 
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For two participants, the time-in-tool metric was significant. There was a 
significant effect for participant 1120: (F(1,28) = 4.869, p = 0.03571) and 
participant 1121: (F(1,28) = 4.692, p = 0.03896), with an alpha value of 0.05. For 
participant 1120 and 1121, the time spent in the tools was statistically significant for the 
confidence of the alert. A decreasing trend line is readily apparent in Figure 19, showing 
Confidence versus Time-in-Tool for Participant 1120. This trend line shows that tools are 
used for shorter periods of time, when the participant expresses higher confidence. 
 
Figure 19: Confidence vs Time-in-Tool – Participant 1120 
For participant 1121, a decreasing trend line is evident in Figure 20, although it is 
not as steep as Figure 19. The trend line shows that as confidence increases the time spent 
in tools decreases, which is the similar case for participant 1120. 
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Figure 20: Confidence vs Time-in-Tool – Participant 1121 
For the other participants, there was no statistical difference in their time-in-tool 
performance. Therefore further data exploration was necessary to find other patterns of 
behaviors which could be used to estimate confidence.  
4.2.3.2 Analyzing Time-to-Decision 
Figure 21 was plotted to illustrate the relationship of difficulty with the time to 
make a decision for each participant. Figure 21 seems to suggest that higher difficulty 
does not necessarily map to longer decision times. The initial speculation for this 
phenomenon was that Very Hard alerts may not have as much information readily 
available for the participant, thus causing the investigation to be shorter relative to the 
other difficulties.  
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Figure 21: Time-to-Decision versus Participant (per Difficulty) 
Alternatively, the relationship of time-to-decision and alert difficulty per 
participant could have something to do with confidence, which is another comparison that 
needing to be reviewed and interpreted. The trend lines in Figure 22 suggest that when 
participants are rating alerts with a lower confidence they tend to take a longer time to 
decide on their actions. The majority of the peaks in Figure 22 are Very Hard alerts, which 
actually ends up refuting our initial speculation on Very Hard alerts tending to take less 
time over all to decide on. 
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Figure 22: Time-to-Decision versus Confidence (per Difficulty) 
A one-way ANOVA was used to confirm whether the time-to-decision had a 
statistically significant effect on reported confidence for participants. Six participants 
showed statistical significance, and the results are displayed in Table 8.  
Table 8: One-way ANOVA for Time-to-Decision Based on Confidence Scores 
alpha = 0.05  Fcrit = 4.20 
df = 28 
Time‐to‐Decision 
Participant #  F‐value  P‐value 
1108  4.922  0.03480 
1109  6.080  0.02006 
1110  8.981  0.005661 
1114  8.515  0.006871 
1116  35.74  0.000002 
1121  34.13  0.000003 
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Data exploration continued to compare and contrast the results across all of the 
participants, in order to identify if there was a generalization which could be made from 
the time-to-decision and confidence. Looking at all participants in the experiment, see 
Figure 23, there seems to be a downward trend overall in terms of time-to-decision 
regardless of difficulty. A stabilization of the time-to-decision did not seem to occur, also 
illustrating that the participants could become faster as they grow familiar with the task. 
Overall, training effects are acknowledged, and attempts were made to mitigate them, such 
as providing a training day and various alerts to practice investigating before the actual 
experiment. Confounding variables such as the participant fatigue with the length and 
rigor of the test, may need to be accounted for in future studies. The participant’s cyber 
experience, which was expected to be a confounding variable, showed no effect on the 
time to decision. 
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Figure 23: Time to Decision versus Alert (per Difficulty) 
4.2.3.3 Analyzing Transitions 
 The next phase of analysis involved creating and evaluating transition probability 
matrices. Each transition probability matrix was constructed by summing the total amount 
of tool uses, while keeping track of the last used tool. These transition values were then 
graphically represented as heat maps. These heat maps visually illustrate the frequency of 
tool transitions. The heat maps show the quantity of transitions from the tool identified in 
the row to the tool identified in the column. The heat map does not identify which tool 
was the first or last used in the workflow. 
A heat map was generated for each participant, by each alert. The alerts were first 
grouped by difficulties and reviewed. These heat maps were then reviewed across all 
participants, based on difficulty of the alerts. The intent behind reviewing the tool 
transitions was to determine whether the workflow process, printed on a sheet of paper 
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and given to the participants during the experiment, was followed. The purpose of the 
workflow was to aid all participants, especially those without any cyber alert knowledge 
or experience.  
Figure 24 shows how a strict adherence to the workflow would look like, assuming 
the participant was already familiar with all of the terms in the glossary and did not need 
to consult it. Figure 24 also assumes the participant would be starting from the Alert 
Lookup tool, as is specified in the workflow handout, see Appendix F. The glossary was 
removed from the strict heat map, as looking up a keyword or abbreviation could occur at 
any time and would make a generalized workflow impossible to construct. 
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Figure 24: Strict Workflow Tool Transitions 
 The strict workflow heat map provided a baseline by which to compare the 
workflow process for all of the participants combined together, broken out by difficulty, or 
broken out per participant and each specific round. A heat map combining the workflow 
activity of all participants was created, see Figure 25. This provided a visible 
representation of the workflow process conducted by each participant across all 30 alerts. 
The darker colors represented heavier transitions from and to tools. The heaviest, and most 
frequent, tool transitions were from Alert Lookup to PCap, Frame Info to PCap, and PCap 
to Frame Info. Conversely, the lighter colors indicated less frequent tool transitions. 
Transitions from the Glossary to Frame Info, Glossary to PCap, and Frame Info to 
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Glossary were the least frequent transitions overall for participants, see Figure 25. This 
combined heat map provided interest for observing tool transitions by counting each of the 
tool transitions.  
 
Figure 25: Combined Workflow of All Participants 
It was determined that omitting the glossary uses made it easier to identify patterns 
of tool usage, as the infrequent use would be because of the learning effect by which 
participants are becoming more familiar with terms as they proceed in the experiment. 
Even by including the glossary tool, in some heat map samples, it shows up as only a few 
transitions. As the rounds progressed, and the participant completed more alerts, the usage 
of the glossary tool dropped, along with one other tool. Tool transitions into the Network 
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Info tool exhibited a noticeable drop, similar to the glossary, when looking at all of the 
participants across the rounds. This could mean that the information in both the Glossary 
and Network Info tools were becoming familiar to the participants. This explanation can 
be reinforced by understanding the information available from the tools.  
Five tools which were available to participants, three of the tools were static 
information and two were dynamic. The two dynamic tools, i.e. changing the displayed 
information with every alert, were the PCap and Frame Info tools. The three static tools 
were Alert Lookup, Glossary, and Network Info. The Alert Lookup would be most likely 
be required to be reviewed on every alert, in order to explain the definition of the alert, 
whereas the Glossary and Network Info tools could be omitted in later alerts as the 
information did not change and was able to be imparted in short term memory of the 
participants, e.g. the learning effect. 
84 
 
 
Figure 26: Participant 1108 Heat Maps by Round 
The drop off of Glossary and Network Info usage was further confirmed when 
reviewing all of the participant’s heat maps, based on the five rounds, although no 
statistical significance calculations were done to confirm this. Figure 26 showcases the 
first participant in the experiment, which highlights the drop in tool transitions to the 
Glossary and Network Info tools as the rounds proceed. This result seemed to carry over 
across all 11 participants, leading the future transition counts omitting transitions across 
Glossary and Network Info tools, in order to account for the learning effect. 
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Figure 27 shows the average tool use, across all participants, based on the 
difficulty of the alert. Tool usage seemed to be the highest, on average, across participants 
when looking at Very Hard alerts. Further analysis will be conducted on tool usage, in 
relation to the time spent in tools, later on in analysis. 
 
Figure 27: Frequency of Tool Usage by Amount of Alerts (per Difficulty) 
4.2.3.4 Analyzing Tool Transition Counts 
The next analysis effort was on tool transition counts and identifying whether they 
related to changing difficulties and confidence. It was hypothesized that the frequency of 
tool transition would correlate to lower or higher confidence levels in within-subject 
comparisons, while not necessarily being broad enough to relate to between subject 
comparisons. In Figure 28, transition counts trended upwards as difficulty increased for 
participants: 1111, 1112, 1114, 1119, 1120, 1121, and 1122.  
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Figure 28: Participant versus Average Tool Transition Count (per Difficulty) 
For all but two participants, the transition counts for Hard alerts were the lowest. 
Participant 1110’s lowest average transition count occurred with Very Hard alerts, 
whereas Participant 1119’s lowest average transition count occurred with Easy alerts. 
Both participant 1110 and 1119 had cyber security experience and cyber certifications, but 
the four other participant’s with cyber security experience had the lowest transition counts 
with Hard alerts like the majority of the participant population. Other confounding factors 
may have played a role in the lower transition counts of Hard alerts, including the small 
amount of Very Hard alerts. Accounting for learning effects by counterbalancing the 
ordering of the alerts may explain this anomaly. Further analysis will be recommended in 
future work. 
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Table 9: Average Transition Count Based on Difficulty and Confidence Bins 
      Average Transition Count 
Participant  Difficulty  CI (0,25]  CI (25,50]  CI (50,75]  CI (75,100] 
1108  Easy  2  3.81  N/A  2.94 
1108  Medium  N/A  N/A  2  4.13 
1108  Hard  N/A  1.67  2.14  2.33 
1108 
Very 
Hard 
3  N/A  3.45  N/A 
1109  Easy  5.18  4.07  3.36  N/A 
1109  Medium  6.08  3.78  3  3 
1109  Hard  2.78  2.67  3.23  2.25 
1109 
Very 
Hard 
4.22  3.91  2.25  1.6 
1110  Easy  N/A  4.94  5.63  4.42 
1110  Medium  N/A  6.4  N/A  3.84 
1110  Hard  7.3  N/A  N/A  3.83 
1110 
Very 
Hard 
N/A  N/A  N/A  4.63 
1111  Easy  6.61  3.86  5.84  5.29 
1111  Medium  N/A  6.4  3.57  5.68 
1111  Hard  3.57  N/A  2.83  4.17 
1111 
Very 
Hard 
N/A  6.78  N/A  5.45 
1112  Easy  N/A  N/A  4.33  5.2 
1112  Medium  N/A  N/A  4.75  3.38 
1112  Hard  N/A  4.18  3.71  3.44 
1112 
Very 
Hard 
N/A  6.09  N/A  3.27 
1114  Easy  N/A  N/A  1.25  3.53 
1114  Medium  N/A  5.36  N/A  1.69 
1114  Hard  N/A  4.62  N/A  2.67 
1114 
Very 
Hard 
N/A  3.57  5.45  3.1 
1116  Easy  N/A  5.37  5.86  4 
1116  Medium  N/A  6.23  N/A  3.15 
1116  Hard  N/A  3.89  3.19  2.87 
1116 
Very 
Hard 
5.47  N/A  N/A  3.37 
1119  Easy  3.25  N/A  3.04  3.03 
1119  Medium  N/A  3.57  4.59  3.05 
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1119  Hard  N/A  2  3.73  3.14 
1119 
Very 
Hard 
N/A  3.47  3.8  N/A 
1120  Easy  N/A  2.33  1.33  4.65 
1120  Medium  N/A  N/A  2.55  3.25 
1120  Hard  1.2  2.2  4.24  1.96 
1120 
Very 
Hard 
N/A  2.33  N/A  5.07 
1121  Easy  N/A  3.88  3.17  3.39 
1121  Medium  N/A  3.7  4.89  3.35 
1121  Hard  3  N/A  N/A  2.88 
1121 
Very 
Hard 
5.12  5.46  N/A  N/A 
1122  Easy  4.8  5.43  7.06  4.58 
1122  Medium  N/A  4.33  7.39  2 
1122  Hard  N/A  N/A  4.69  3.87 
1122 
Very 
Hard 
N/A  7.3  6.46  5.79 
 
Table 9 suggests that lower reported confidence mapped to higher transition 
counts, for several participants. The table represents the transition counts, broken out 
across bins of confidence scores, in order to illustrate the disparity in confidence scoring 
for certain alert difficulties.  
For five participants: 1109, 1110, 1114, 1116, and 1121, the transition counts were 
statistically significant based on the confidence scores, see Table 10.  
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Table 10: One-way ANOVA for Transition Count Based on Confidence Scores 
 
The effect of transition counts on confidence, for each participant, respective of the 
alert difficulty is displayed as Table 11.  
Table 11: Transition Count and Confidence per Difficulty (by Participant) 
Participant  Difficulty  Tool Transition Count  Confidence 
1108  Easy  3.333333  68.14667 
1108  Medium  3.939394  85.06061 
1108  Hard  2.243243  84.81081 
1108 
Very 
Hard 
3.346154  61.69231 
1109  Easy  3.979381  45 
1109  Medium  4.26087  42.47826 
1109  Hard  2.966102  44.25424 
1109 
Very 
Hard 
3.242424  46.51515 
1110  Easy  4.818966  71.89655 
1110  Medium  5.447761  59.9403 
1110  Hard  5.2625  63.5125 
1110 
Very 
Hard 
4.630435  88.1087 
1111  Easy  5.607692  68.91538 
1111  Medium  5.902778  62.875 
1111  Hard  3.888889  80.76389 
1111 
Very 
Hard 
6.479167  53.95833 
alpha = 0.05 Fcrit = 4.20
df = 28
Participant # F‐value P‐value
1109 7.262 0.01177
1110 17.38 0.000266
1114 4.228 0.04918
1116 7.092 0.01269
1121 6.778 0.0146
Transition Count
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1112  Easy  5.108434  90.14458 
1112  Medium  3.972973  85.32432 
1112  Hard  3.662338  71.16883 
1112 
Very 
Hard 
5.372093  62.7907 
1114  Easy  3.380952  92.63492 
1114  Medium  3.375  75.04167 
1114  Hard  3.217391  78.17391 
1114 
Very 
Hard 
4.142857  74.53571 
1116  Easy  4.842105  77.42105 
1116  Medium  4.5625  63.22917 
1116  Hard  3.322034  65.11864 
1116 
Very 
Hard 
4.294118  51.5 
1119  Easy  3.056338  71.1831 
1119  Medium  3.833333  71.64583 
1119  Hard  3.246377  76.82609 
1119 
Very 
Hard 
3.648649  52.18919 
1120  Easy  4.303371  92.30337 
1120  Medium  3.028571  92.14286 
1120  Hard  2.666667  75.17647 
1120 
Very 
Hard 
4.588235  86.17647 
1121  Easy  3.424658  85.27397 
1121  Medium  4  71.35417 
1121  Hard  2.887097  81.67742 
1121 
Very 
Hard 
5.311475  34.7541 
1122  Easy  5.087302  70.83333 
1122  Medium  5.823529  58.72549 
1122  Hard  4.25  81.20238 
1122 
Very 
Hard 
6.473684  63.42105 
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4.3  Electrophysiological Analysis and Results 
Preliminary analysis of the recorded EEG data was conducted to ensure all of the 
channels were recorded through all of the participant’s trials. EEGLAB, the primary 
MATLAB plugin used for analyzing EEG data, only showed a handful of channels upon 
inspection. Further constraints, such as unfamiliarity with electrophysiological analysis, 
led to the EEG results being compiled and cataloged but not analyzed. Therefore, this 
analysis will end up being exclusively left to future work.  
4.4 Summary 
It was hypothesized at the beginning of this chapter that that ordering of tool use, 
the time per tool, and the overall time to a decision would correlate to the differences 
when comparing the confidence of each alert decision, per participant. The analysis and 
results show, with statistical significance, that not only was time per tool, measured at 
time-in-tool, important, but the time-to-decision and tool transition count were all 
behaviors which affected reported confidence. Data exploration of the behavior data 
extracted from CIAT allowed for seven of the eleven participants to have behaviors 
mapped to their confidence. Four participants did not illicit a behavior pattern which could 
be identified with the analysis methods covered above. In addition, the ordering of tool 
use was not able to be validated with statistical significance, and is left to future work, see 
more in Section 5.3.4. 
With only 30 alerts available to analyze, a larger data set of participants and alerts 
may lead to other factors becoming more relevant for identifying and mapping behavior to 
confidence. 
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The behaviors extrapolated from this research are specific to this synthetic task 
environment, and would need to be generalized and applied to other tools in order to 
expand the results across all cyber based investigations. Since this study only involved 11 
participants it would be worthwhile to conduct an experiment with more participants, to 
determine if these behaviors can be generalized given a larger sample size. 
In summary, the behavioral and subjective analysis led to the observation and 
statistical validation of three behavior factors which effect reported decision confidence. 
Dependent on a larger sample size and analysis of the EEG measurements, the findings of 
the behavioral analysis already allows for identifying behavior mechanics, specific to each 
participant, which map to reported decision confidence.  
  
93 
V. Conclusions and Recommendations 
5.1 Conclusions of Research 
The behavioral analysis of both the pool of participants and each participant 
specifically, allowed for the identification of key behavioral factors, which correlated 
with confidence. Table 12, displays a summary of the three behaviors analyzed in 
Chapter 4. The statistical significance of the ANOVA results are explained in the 
associated behavior analysis portions of Section 4.2.3. One participant’s confidence, 
participant 1121, correlated with all three analyzed patterns of behavior. Additionally, 
four participants, participant 1111, 1112, 1119, and 1122, exhibited no behavioral effects 
on their confidence. 
Table 12: Behaviors Which Effect Confidence 
Behavioral Correlation with Confidence (as confidence increases) 
Participant #  Time‐in‐Tool  Time‐to‐Decision  Transition Count 
1108  ~  ↓  ~  LEGEND 
1109  ~  ↓  ↓  ↑  Increased 
1110  ~  ↓  ↓  ↓  Decreased 
1111  ~  ~  ~  ~  No effect 
1112  ~  ~  ~ 
1114  ~  ↓  ↓ 
1116  ~  ↓  ↓ 
1119  ~  ~  ~ 
1120  ↓  ~  ~ 
1121  ↓  ↓  ↓ 
1122  ~  ~  ~ 
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The time-to-decision behavior influenced the confidence in six out of eleven 
participants. Based on the results, no generalization of what effects of the tested 
population can be made at this time, based on the analyzed behavior patterns.  
This conclusion assumes that the overall understanding of how confidence and 
behavior effect the formulation of a decision is correct. The alert difficulty was the factor 
which was varied in the experiment. This led to behavior and an associated confidence, 
which ultimately lead to a decision by the participant. The factors which effected behavior 
were attributed to time, both in tool usage and overall decision time, and the transition 
count among the available tools. Decision confidence was recorded after each decision 
was made. With future electrophysiological analysis, the goal would be to determine what 
specific behaviors correlate to increased or decreased confidence up to the point of a 
decision being made. 
Answering RQ1, the results of this study indicate that three key behavioral factors 
correlated with participant confidence during the formulation of participant decisions. 
These patterns of behavior were Time-in-Tool, Time-to-Decision, and tool Transition 
Counts. Seven of the eleven participants in this study exhibited one or more of these 
patterns of behavior. 
Answering RQ2, the results showed that even when participants were given time to 
practice and a workflow process to follow, they would deviate from the workflow 
regardless of confidence. Future analysis will need to be completed, to determine whether 
there is a statistical significance to workflow tool usage, as this could indicate reliance on 
experience or familiarity with the tools and investigation. The captured EEG data may 
reveal insight into behaviors associated with tool transitions and tool usage. Although five 
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tools were available, the tools were not always reviewed in the same order or in the same 
amount, providing further behavioral differences when compared to the reported 
confidence levels during investigations. Statistical analysis will need to be completed in 
order to make a conclusion about tool usage ordering. 
Answering RQ3, the results show that behavior patterns correlated with increases 
in decision confidence, but the converse needs be confirmed with further statistical 
analysis. Namely, the next logical question is: what behavior patterns are associated with a 
low confidence decision? Time-to-Decision decreased for participants who more confident 
in their decisions, possibly brought about by not having to spend arduous amounts of time 
repeatedly going over the same tools. Lower tool transition counts, and the associated time 
in these tools, also mapped to higher reported confidence in several participants. 
Participant 1121 exhibited all three behaviors with increased confidence. 
Answering RQ4, the electrophysiological will be evaluated in future research, thus 
any quantifiable differences in EEG metrics are unable to be confirmed at this time.  
Notwithstanding the EEG analysis, to reiterate the findings from RQ3, three 
distinct behaviors were observed to occur when participants were in lower confidence 
situations. Likewise, the inverse of these results showcases that higher confidence 
decisions tend to occur when decisions are made faster, relative to other alerts. The speed 
to a decision, should not be taken as the only behavior though, as this could lead to 
inaccuracy if purely looking at time, although this quantifiable measurements it the easiest 
to compare within and between participants. 
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5.2 Significance of Research 
Thanks to the modularity of the CIAT STE, the additional features supported in 
CIAT 2.0, will allow for future studies in behavioral analysis to be completed with simple 
alterations to the dataset in the Microsoft Access database. Keeping with the modular 
design of CIAT, CIAT 2.0 allows for rounds to be of varying alert amounts, and for the 
addition or subtraction of tools for the users. Additionally, CIAT 2.0 enables EEG 
collection, as it supports timing and signal forwarding to the Cognionics Data Acquisitions 
suite of tools.  
This study indicates that the investigative process in cyber defense, which 
ultimately leads to a decision based on varying degrees of confidence inferred from tool 
review and task understanding, requires further analysis to better understand how human 
behavior may be measured and analyzed. Some behavioral assertions can be extrapolated 
by only reviewing the workflow process or the self-reported metrics from simple 
questionnaires, but the underlying physiological activity may provide a keener insight into 
the degree to which data analysis and the investigative process effects the decision action 
and the associated confidence in this decision. 
The primary significance of this study was the collection of human participant 
behavior, physiological data, and decision confidence from 11 participants, while they 
investigated and decided dispositions for cyber alerts. With this data, further behavioral 
analysis can be conducted, especially as it relates to physiological analysis, as no other 
cyber defense studies have looked into the physiological data of participants. 
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5.3 Recommendations for Future Research 
5.3.1 Design Changes 
Some design changes may be worth implementing in order to limit or eliminate 
confounding variables. During data exploration and analysis, it became apparent that 
several design decisions had created situations in which the participant’s transition 
between the tools used during an investigation could not accurately account for their initial 
tool selection. This was because completing the investigation for a previous alert, and 
making a decision, did not reset the tool selection. The tool selection was left as the 
previous alerts information, thus if the tool was the PCap or Frame Info, the participant 
would already have new information displayed without having to manually request it by 
selecting the tool. This had the possibility of skewing the actual tool transition statistics 
toward less tool transitions. A remedy for this scenario would reset the entire tool 
selection area of CIAT to be empty, whenever a new alert is selected, thus forcing the 
participant to intentionally select their first tool each time they work on a new alert. 
The structuring of six alerts per round in CIAT was intended to limit and balance 
the amount of information presented to the participant at one time, while also separating 
rounds by a consistent amount, given 30 total alerts and the experiment’s 2-hour time 
limit. During the design of the synthetic task environment, the decision to display six 
alerts per round was justified in order to give a manageable amount of workload requiring 
the participant’s focus and attention, prior to a short built-in break. The decision 
confidence ranking was structured as a validation of the previous decisions made during 
the investigative phase of the experiment, since the numerical confidence values were not 
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displayed for the participant. This prevented the participant from simply ordering the 
numbers from largest to smallest, as well as forcing them to break any ties by arranging 
the alerts in order from most confident to least confident per round. One simple design 
change could be implemented in order to limit distractions. Since the alerts are all 
designed to be self-contained and independent, the interface could be structured to only 
display one alert at a time. This change, bundled with the reset of the tool selection would 
force the participant to make each investigative decision without any prior set tool. 
Additionally, this would prevent the participant from selecting an alert, reading some of 
the information, and changing to another alert.  
Another benefit of only displaying one alert at a time to the participant, would 
allow for a restructuring of the alerts per participant. This would counter the learning 
effect currently observed in the data, as each participant could be configured to see a 
different preset ordering of the alerts. As mentioned previously, the investigation time did 
not plateau or trend to a specific bound for any of the participants during the 30 alerts. 
More alerts or a preset ordering of the alerts, could assist in determining the lower bound 
of investigative time required to make a decision, as well as countering the learning 
effect. Additionally, since the ordering of the alerts presented to the user would be 
controlled, this would eliminate differences in investigation timing, better accounting for 
possible confounding variables such as participant fatigue. 
A recommended change to the ordering of the alerts, would help account for the 
learning effect. By counterbalancing the presentation of the alerts to the participants, it 
would become possible to review the alerts without having to look for a performance 
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plateau. This would account for the learning effect or possible fatigue, which may explain 
why the time to decision continued to decrease in general throughout the experiment. 
5.3.2 EEG Analysis 
Since this study’s analysis omitted EEG analysis, the data still needs to be 
reviewed. Everything from clicks and timing to decision and accuracy may end up 
providing additional behavioral factors which may validate whether the behaviors 
extrapolated from the subjective and behavioral analysis were valid. 
5.3.3 Participant Selection for Future Trials 
The participant selection pool was greatly limited for this research. Not only were 
all participants AFIT students or employees, but there were no female participants nor a 
sizeable amount of participants with cyber backgrounds in cyber defense. Future studies 
should extend the findings in this research by recording the behavior of those in the cyber 
defense community with this expertise. The pool of participants could be broken into 
groups based on time certified on cyber defense tools, and their level of computer or cyber 
security certifications. Participation from an Air Force cyber defense unit would garner 
additional insight into the types of tools and tasks which make up the investigative 
process, especially based on tool usage frequency and the general workflow or process 
dictated by the unit’s job. Ultimately, there may not be much of a discrepancy between the 
efficiency or confidence of participants, when comparing those with cyber defense 
expertise versus those without, due to the provided training and self-contained structure of 
this experiment. This would validate the efficacy and usefulness of this synthetic task 
environment, allowing for continued modifications and modularity to pinpoint what 
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factors affect the decision confidence of operators. For example, complementary tools 
may end up having a greater effect on investigation time, and therefore decision 
confidence, if it requires the operator to frequently switch between tools. Distinct tools, on 
the other hand, may make it easier to progress through an investigation in a workflow 
style, thus increasing decision confidence or accuracy. 
5.3.4 Other Data Analysis 
Continued analysis of the tool transitions could possibly explain the time-in-tool 
results. If statistical analysis is done for the tool transitions, it should also investigate the 
originating and final tool used for each investigation. Analysis of the originating and final 
tools used for an investigation was not investigated in this study. 
Some tool pattern usage analysis was done, but no significant results were found, 
in part due to difficulties in establishing a method for comparing the order of tool usage 
per alert and per participants. One method for analyzing the transition probability matrices 
is to conduct distance measurements between each alert and round for each participant. 
Each tool transition count, made up of each source and destination tool pairing, can be 
compared to other alerts by calculating the Euclidean distance. This matrix comparison 
method was proposed, but due to time limitations it will be left as proposed future work. 
5.3.5 Other Recommendations 
Current systems exhibit either a machine-feeds-human or human-feeds-machine-
feeds-human style of network defense, for most if not all general computer interaction. An 
example of machine-feeds-human can be illustrated by the relationship humans have with 
IDS devices. These host and network IDS devices rely on humans to make the decision on 
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information recorded, organized, and displayed to human users. Human-feeds-machine-
feeds-human situations are those in which a host and network intrusion prevention system 
(IPS) relies on the human feeding the machine rules and evaluation criteria, by which the 
system takes action, although the human is available at any moment to modify the criteria 
based on feedback. Knowing these limitations, the motivation for this research is to 
improve trust and confidence with the systems human operate, by allowing the machine to 
monitor the human and identify when the investigation process was compromised by poor 
analysis behavior. This would allow a machine to augment the human in any computer-
focused task, as long as there is a sufficient baselining or patterns of behavior to 
extrapolate.  
Monitoring and improving decision confidence enables consistent and expedited 
effectiveness in those people training on these cyber defense tools, as well as the ability to 
extend monitoring of decision confidence to quality assurance capability for those 
currently operating on the tools. Decision confidence can lead to improved quality 
assurance and work output, with minimal overhead, thanks to the computer agents that 
assist in determining confidence metrics from tool usage, timing, and even the humans’ 
write-up.  These three areas, quality assurance, training, and tool usage, can all be 
measured using a subset of the methodologies illustrated above. Additionally, it would 
make the most operational sense to task experienced human users, or team leads, as they 
would be able to review or share in making the final decision on ambiguous or alerts 
where low decision confidence is estimated. This research, due to its focus on human 
efficacy, should apply to any cyber defense tool or process, as long as human-in-the-loop 
102 
decisions are required, as their decision-making and decision-confidence will always play 
a role in software. 
5.4 Summary 
In summary, this research fills an important gap in the literature regarding 
understanding the decision confidence of cyber defense analysts by looking at behavior 
patterns while they conduct investigations. The electrophysiological data may provide 
additional insight into how cyber analyst’s behaviors may be influenced outside of what 
can be recorded from a computer interface. The decision-making process relies on 
confidence in the tools, but more heavily on the experience and understanding of the 
analysts who carry out reviewing the data. The identified behavior patterns allow for an 
estimation of decision confidence in regard to cyber based alert investigations. With an 
understanding of the behavior and estimated confidence level of analysts, assistive tools 
and techniques can be implemented to allow for quality assurance, tailored training, and 
other enhancements for the cyber warfighter.  
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